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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the relationships between market coverage, franchise
ownership, and franchise outlet survival rate.
In the first essay, I develop a spatial market coverage measure by integrating geocodes of
outlets across five fast-food franchise systems. This spatial market coverage builds upon one
navigation system algorithm by utilizing geographic coordinates. This measure can be applied by
entrepreneurs to examine their geographic coverage and address issues of market oversaturation
and lack of coverage.
In the second essay, I extend the spatial market coverage and examine how this spatial
market coverage and franchise ownerships affect franchise outlet survival rate, which has not been
thoroughly studied. I find that: 1) different franchise owners have substantial differences in unit
survival rate; 2) reasonable control of space market coverage is also critical to the outlet survival.
Collectively, my dissertation creates a spatial market coverage that has a high explanatory
power to illuminate the relationship between corporate ownership and unit survival. The spatial
market coverage provides a new approach to exam a franchise system or a retailer’s geographical
distribution or coverage. These two studies provide a guidance for entrepreneurs to expand the
market and improve the outlet's survival rate by utilizing different ownerships.
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1 Introduction
This dissertation contains two essays that explore the effects of franchise ownership and
spatial market coverage in the franchising industry. These two chapters introduce a unique
geographical dataset to create a novel spatial market coverage to describe the outlets' distribution
situation. The relationships of market coverage, ownership, and outlet survival are investigated.
Chapter 1 has two major parts. First, the spatial market coverage is created by importing
location information of each outlet of five large fast-food franchise systems. This spatial coverage
measure provides strong criterion validity compared to the traditional market coverage measure.
It guides entrepreneurs to improve not only the unit but also the whole system revenue. Second,
the franchise ownership effects on market coverage are presented. The results show that the KFC,
Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell can enlarge multi-unit franchise size, or recruit more franchisees to
increase the spatial coverage.
Chapter 2 examines the factors that affect the location survival rate. While most current
researchers focus on the franchisor or new system failure, the unit survival of a mature franchise
is under-researched. The secondary data shows that store losses in the four franchise systems are
around 9%. In some counties, all outlets disappeared after five years. This loss brings a
considerable cost to both franchisees and franchisors. Therefore, I investigate the location survival
rate of four large fast-food franchise chains in this essay.
My findings show that the greater the spatial market coverage, the greater the concern for
locations clusters, the lower the location survival rate. Company-owned outlets have a positive
effect on the probability of a site's survival. The impact of a multi-unit franchised system on unit
survival rate depends on the food category and brand. The results provide strong evidence that
entrepreneurs can keep the location survival rate through assigning reasonable ownership.
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2. Chapter 1 Market Coverage and Company-owned Outlets in Mature Franchise Systems:
An Examination of YUM! Brands
2.1 Introduction
Adequate market coverage is the critical goal in the development any franchising system
that desires to be a well-recognized, national branded system. Past efforts to examine routes to
effective coverage (Stassen and Grunhagen, 2011, 2016) have been limited in interpretation, in
that the dependent measure, the number of outlets per an aggregate characteristic of demand was
also a frequent appearing standardization of the independent measures, such as the proportion of
outlets—or highly correlated with other measures, such as the number of franchises. Further, the
low portion of explained variance and inconsistency of independent variable significance raised
questions about the measure’s validity. Geographic outlet location, or “geodata,” is frequently
available for simple street address data, and linked with franchisee location ownership, can address
market coverage without being confounded with independent measures.
The achievement of rapid coverage in franchise systems is predominantly through
independently-owned franchise locations, but the remaining role of company-ownership of
locations in system expansion and coverage is unclear. At present, there has not been a thorough
“competitive” examination of the use of company-owned and franchisee-owned establishments in
achieving market coverage, particularly in the current period where the use of large, multi-unit
franchisees to achieve coverage makes the distinction of possible advantage to operating companyowned units less clear.
Further, it’s not known if there is an optimal mix of company-owned outlets is within a
franchised chain, nor if a “mix” of ownership is necessary. Completely franchised chains, such as
Subway, have admittedly overstored some markets, announcing 500 locations will be closed in
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2018, in addition to the 800 closed in 2017, but there will remain over 25,000 stores in the U.S.,
without any being a company-owned outlet (White, 2018). Having some locations that are
company-owned would show franchisees a shared sentiment to over-storing a market. Starbucks,
contrast, reports 8,575 locations in the U.S. which are entirely company-operated (Form 10-K,
2018), bearing the total risk of operating too many outlets. The approach to resolving this basic
question comes from understanding how changes in market coverage can be measured, and if the
measures can be useful measures predicting performance.
This paper presents a review of literature regarding the coverage and intrabrand
competition related to the alternatives of franchisee and franchisor-ownership as an introduction
to the structural measures, namely, use of multi-unit franchisees and company-owned outlets, that
figure in current discussion about their purpose in achieving market coverage. An encouraging
result using a measure from the latitude and longitude of locations in a cross sectional analysis is
discussed, with implications provided.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
2.2.1 Market Coverage and The Franchise Concept
Business format franchising succeeds when a recognized consumer brand can provide an
expected quality of service across and within markets. The greater the market coverage, or
distribution intensity, the stronger the repeat purchasing of the brand, and the stronger the brand’s
value in regard to competition. Lower distribution intensity, or more selective distribution, is
associated with higher consumer search, or the search effort within a market (Beatty and Smith,
1987). Agreement on the amount of consumer search occurring prior to a purchase results would
lead to more agreement between a manufacturer and its exclusive distributors, a manufacturer and
its franchised dealers, and a franchisor and its franchisees.
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In contrast, disagreements are most likely to occur regarding coverage in low-search
situations, where the benefits of good market coverage are easiest seen in the case of quick-service
restaurants, where the costs of store-to-store search are high with respect the price, and competition
among a variety of quick-service formats and menus is common at multiple locations within a
metropolitan market. In these low search conditions, typical approaches to market coverage lack
validity when they don’t incorporate the importance of the spatial separation of outlets with respect
to store search.
Traditionally, market coverage has been considered a ratio of establishments per the
market’s demand, or number of potential buyers in the market (Blair and LaFontaine, 2005). This
is regarded as an accepted ratio, and appropriately identifies geographic markets that are over or
under-stored, with too high, or too low of a ratio of stores per person, per household, or per
automobile. Since outlets are developed with a known revenue for location, a saturated market
risks reducing sales per store, and increases the likelihood that the franchisee operates
underperforming locations, and reduces the demand of new franchisees.
Research on market coverage is not abundant, but more has been addressed on higher
search product. In the case of home electronics, manufacturers believed strong brands could
sustain limited distribution per market (Frazier and Lassar, 1996). In the case of automobiles sales
in larger markets which require overlapping dealer territories, defining the market size
appropriately is important. In these higher search conditions, the use of spatial dispersion
measures to minimize intrabrand competition can be effective in resolving difference in brand
growth and territory exclusivity (Bucklin, Siddarth, and Silva-Risso 2008).
For convenience goods, such as meals at quick-service restaurants, multiple locations in a
market with a variety of competing and complementary franchise concepts can be supported, and
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choice of concept can be based on the importance of variety, drive-thru time, and waiting time.
Larger metropolitan areas have multiple areas where convenience to work, from school, during
travel, and while on shopping trips. The potential of markets to support meals away from home is
conceptually different from a more static approach that is limited to the number of the market’s
households and population, for products and services consumed in the home. In short, having an
outlet in visibility of competing formats is likely more important today than the benefits assured
from an exclusivity of a territory or location in terms of the number of stores or size of population.
A measure of spatial coverage would be beneficial in understanding a franchise format that benefits
from high visibility and outlets in a market, with less dependence on assessing the size of the
market. Much of the understanding of distribution intensity in franchising comes from increasing
units beyond an optimal point, or where concerns about intrabrand competition overshadow needs
to compete with other brands. Some discussion about factors favoring franchising growth and
encroachment follows.
2.2.2 Franchisees and Company-owned Stores
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) posited that there would be a substantial number of better
performing locations reacquired by the franchisor, and that successful franchise chains would
become predominantly franchisor-owned. Their perspective was of franchisors competing with
their franchisees to retain better locations is inconsistent with today’s successful franchisors
becoming very dependent on multiunit franchisees. YUM! Brands was often an example of one
franchisor increasing its company-owned locations as late as 2015, but has since lowered its
company-owned share of locations, now including “refranchising” as term its annual report. Their
recent shift away from company-owned outlets indicates that this strategy’s performance was not
the best overall for the franchising system.
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The concept of independent ownership of outlets is an inherent aspect of franchise system,
where the independent owner-franchisee operates franchised locations in exchange for
combination of lump-sum and a stream of royalty payments to the franchisor for use of the systems
trademarks (Blair and Kaserman, 1983). Initially, a small system of company-owned locations
with record of earning provides potential franchisees a proven format is required, with established
quality and performance characteristic.

From a resource dependence approach, franchisee

ownership is critical at early stages of system development, and provides the initial capital
resources for rapid system growth (Caves and Murphy, 1976). This resource perspective was first
challenged by Rubin (1978), showing that with a portfolio approach to a system’s locations, the
risk borne by an individual franchisee with a single location was greater than that assumed by a
franchisor operation company-locations.
The resource model is complemented by the agency perspective that illustrates that a firm
costs of contracting with an “agent”, or that monitoring an employee, provides incentives to the
franchisor to form an agreement with a party, here, the franchisee that can claim any profits, or
residuals, of the operation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Franchisee
monitoring of multiple locations was believed to provide sustained growth, overcoming the
anticipated agency problems with company-owned outlets being operated by employees (Brickley,
Dark, and Weisbach, 1991; Lafontaine, 1992). In the same sense, having locations operated by
multiple unit franchisees have reduced the need for the franchisor to monitor performance across
locations, providing a hierarchy of supervision within the franchisee organization, and have lower
failure rates (Bradach, 1997; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004).
Importantly to franchise systems, these multi-unit franchisees have led to superior market
coverage.

Kaufmann and Dant (1996) found that the more a chain engages in multi-unit
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franchising, the faster the chain system grows, and with this, the coverage across markets.
Franchisees become multi-unit owners either by sub-franchising over time or, sign an area
development agreement with franchisor at the beginning with the prerequisite being these
franchising are superior operators (Bates 1998, Bradach, 1998). These master franchisees also have
the first-hand market information of local market, especially the knowledge of realized local
demand (Mathewson Winter, 1985; Norton, 1988), of consumer tastes (Minkler, 1992), and of unit
productivity (Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya, 1995). In addition, by using multi-unit franchising a
franchisor can slice its monitoring hierarchy and substitutes lower-level employee monitors with
independent entities. Multi-unit franchisees’ compensation depends entirely on outlet performance,
which makes them more motivated monitors compared with employee-monitors (Jindal 20110).
Also, the stronger motivation, the less monitoring cost than employee-monitors, which further
reduces the hierarchy the franchisor needs. Multi-unit franchising is a reasonable way for
franchisors to use knowledgeable franchisees to expand market. Furthermore, the promise of
additional units for high-performance franchisees acts as an incentive device in these chains.
According to the theory of economics of agglomeration, the concentration of the franchisee’s units
is geographically close to each other. This demographically similar markets can beneficial the
multi-units’ owners by minimizing the costs to the franchisee of monitoring all his units (Kalnins
and Lafontaine 2004).
2.2.3 Intrabrand Competition, Encroachment, and Coverage
The issue of company-owned stores versus franchised locations takes on a heightened
interest with regard to intrabrand competition, and the achievement of optimal coverage for the
brand. In the prior discussion of market coverage, conflicts emerge when an increased distribution
intensity beneficial to the brand is detrimental to exclusivity of distribution that obtained
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commitments from independent retailers. Similarly, the increased coverage is beneficial to the
franchisor through the increased royalties based on franchisee revenues, reducing the sales per
store, below what is optimal for the franchisee. In short, the franchisee would choose to operate
fewer locations where earnings versus costs would be maximized; competing franchisees would
operate more locations, and maximize revenues, and as such, royalties paid to the franchisor.
Multiunit franchisees operate for the majority of units in modern franchising systems, such
as Subway, McDonalds, and YUM! Brands, and their demonstrated record of performance has led
to the increased coverage of markets. Experiences shared within a franchise organization and
between other multiunit franchisees reducing store failure rates maintaining market coverages
(Kanlins and Mayer, 2004). Separately, neighboring multi-unit franchisees have new locations
adjacent to existing stores, and form clusters of stores within a metropolitan area, closer than the
optimal spacing anticipated (Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004). These clusters will include locations
varying in revenue but remain are preferable to the franchisee in terms of overall revenue than
losing the revenue to a competing intrabrand neighbor (Stassen and Mittetstaedt, 1995). While
intrabrand competition is normally detrimental revenue per location, it can have mixed results in
the hotel industry. Kalnins (2004) showed the dramatic difference between the encroachment by
an additional franchisee unit, negatively affecting the revenue of ‘incumbent’ franchisees, while
oppositely, additional company-owned hotels increased sales at other company-owned hotels.
In contrast to the evidence supporting franchised systems, wholly company-operated
locations are doing very well in growth and financial performance. According to QSR, privately
held companies Chick-fil A, and Whataburger, have enjoyed growth with wholly corporateoperated locations, and currently are the top 2 companies in sales per store, at $4.4 and $2.7 million
(Oches, 2018). Similar performance is shown at publicly held Starbucks, $2.2 million per store,
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at its 9,684 company-operated stores, with Darden Restaurants averaging $4.64 per store at its
1740 locations (2018 10-K). To summarize, conventional approaches showing the superiority of
acquisition of resources for explaining growth, or agency an agency perspective explaining
superior monitoring, are challenged by the successes of corporate-operated outlets.
2.2.4 Hypotheses
Regarding market coverage and outlet dispersal, we pose the following hypotheses
regarding company-ownership of locations versus franchise ownership that follow a traditional
perspective that an increase in franchisor ownership would maximize a market’s profitability for
the franchisor. The spatial separation of stores, and as such, the average sales per store, would be
maximized to minimize intrabrand competition. A higher density of stores would maximize a
market’s revenues and royalties paid to the franchisor.
Hypothesis 1: The greater the proportion of company-owned locations in a market, the
greater is the concern for maximization of outlet profitability, the lower concern for market
coverage.
For greater franchisee, or multi-unit franchisee, the hypothesis is opposite with regard to
coverage from royalty payments paid to the franchisor from competitive market providing
numerous franchisees. If a franchisor can achieve additional franchisee coverage by larger number
of competing franchisees in the market, more locations can be developed:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of franchisees in a market, the greater the market’s
coverage.
Similarly, the extent a market can be provided coverage by multiunit franchisees, adjacent
locations will be operated by a single franchisee, assuring better coverage of the market, lower
inter-store distances, and a broader range in the revenues per location. The extent that a market
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has a higher ratio in franchisee locations per franchisee, we expect these markets to have greater
market coverage.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the proportion of ownership through multiunit franchisee stores
in a market, the greater the concern for maximization of system revenues is the objective, the
greater the market coverage.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Data
The locations for the brands, KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken), Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell
were used for a study of coverage and market structure. YUM! Brands (YUM) has three of the
oldest franchising concepts developed in the U.S., where each have become international brands.
The three major brands were originally individual franchise systems, but began with Pepsico
acquiring Pizza Hut in 1977, Taco Bell in 1978, and KFC in 1986. These have been under a single
ownership since, currently with YUM, but managed through different franchise offices, with KFC
in Louisville, KY, Pizza Hut in Wichita, KS, and Taco Bell in Los Angeles, CA.
The YUM 10-K (2018) provides detailed counts of franchised and company-owned
locations, by franchise brand. This practice of reporting by brand was begun for fiscal year 2014
to the present. Values in these three-year reports have changed slightly, and the newest reported
count has been used instead of a previous count. Table 1 provides the number “new builds”
(construction) and closures for each year listed in the reports affecting the ending count of locations
for the fiscal years, with each brand showing a steady increase in franchisee new construction.
Similarly, the table lists “refranchising” as a positive value, increasing the number of franchisee
locations, where franchisees purchase those locations that were formerly company-owned outlets.
Conversely, “acquired” locations are negative values, where company-owned stores are acquired
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from franchisees. Fiscal year 2013 was the final year when units acquired by the franchisor
exceeded those refranchised to the franchisee in the case of KFC and Pizza Hut.
YUM! Brands has substantially reduced the number of company-owned locations at fiscal
year-end in all three brands, from 1,526 to 668 for KFC, from 788 to 160 for Pizza Hut, and from
923 to 653 for Taco Bell. Their income statement includes a “Refranchising” line where in fiscal
years 2017 and 2016, gains were $1,083 and $163 million, respectively. Clearly, the firm has
changed the strategy of franchise ‘redirection’ at all three brand that was in place prior to 2014.
Dividing total year’s sales by a declining numbers of units in a year-end count, and overstates a
difference in sales per location by type, but outside of the exception by Pizza Hut in 2013 and
2014, following the predictions of Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) those locations developed and
retained as company-owned units are superior locations in sales per store, and support a basis
hypotheses that franchisor-owned locations remain better locations.
A listing of all YUM! Brand locations in the U.S. for the period of 2015-2016 for both
company-owned and franchisee-owned addresses were provided by FRANDATA. The list
contained the franchisee name, and address and zip codes of each location. Decimal degrees
longitude and longitude were provided by a third party firm for each street address. U.S. counties
served as the unit of observations, and zip codes were used to assign addresses to counties, where
aggregate measures of sums, minimums, maximums, for latitude and longitude for each county
were produced. This initial list of all YUM! locations was combined with lists of all Subway and
McDonald’s locations to provide a thorough depiction of quick-service food locations.
U.S. counties provide the observations in the study. Spatial plots of these location’s
latitude and longitude coordinates permitted a visual examination of the largest 200 counties, in
terms of the franchise locations. Locations of restaurants in outlying communities, outside a
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contiguous, uniform, urbanized area were eliminated, and these were in the largest area counties,
while those outlying areas with a street address within a city part of the urbanized area retained.
Counties where over five percent of locations would require elimination were also excluded from
the analysis. From the visual examination, and a requirement of minimal elimination of locations,
155 of the initial 200 counties produced contiguous central-metropolitan areas.
2.3.2 Models and Variables
Multiple regression analysis where two measures of market coverage were regressed on
three structural characteristics of the franchise system were used in a cross-sectional analysis of
the 155 counties. The franchisees per county were aggregated to produce the number of multiunit locations, and multiunit franchisees and their individual store counts within the county.
Three measures serve as independent measures for each county’s structural characteristics
of the franchise system. For the extent of company-ownership, a ratio (%) of company-owned
outlets to total outlets in the county was calculated. Separately, for multiunit size, the number of
total multi-unit franchisee outlets (two or more) to number of multi-unit franchisees provides the
average number of outlets per multi-unit franchisee. Last, to show the competition among
franchisees to develop sites, the number of franchisees provided the third measure. A traditional
coverage measure was used as the dependent measure, where the number of total outlets in the
market (company-owned and franchisee) was divided by the sum of those estimated persons in the
zip codes for 2015 of location.
To measure a spatial measure of coverage in the county, a ratio of the product of range in
latitude and range in longitude for each brand to the same product of ranges for the market was
used (Figure 1 and 2 visualize this measure):
[(#$%&'!"#. )∗*#$%&'!%&'. +]()"*&

Spatial Area Ratio = [(#$%&'
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To account for difference in latitude and longitude distances at different positions in the
U.S., all ranges where adjusted with the Haversine formula, to calculate the shortest great-circle
distances between two locations on a sphere. By measuring how the ranges of locations matches
the ranges of locations in the market, the measure shows how the franchise system has “reached”
from central locations to provide coverage to the entire market.
Table 2 provides the metropolitan areas within the counties with the minimum, maximum,
mean and standard deviation for the KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell location. Looking across the
three brand’s Outlets per person and Spatial area ratio, similarity of the two measures to capture
the aspect of coverage, particularly at the minimum values, where values approaching 0 are
contrasted with maximum values approaching 1.0. (In Orleans Parish, LA, there is a single
location of a KFC, so without a range, the numerator is 0.) Also, one brand, KFC has the lowest
Outlets per person and the lowest Spatial area ratio. Both measures also having suitable standard
deviations to serve as dependent variables to examine the contrast in metro areas.
Table 3 provides the correlations of each of the measures for each brand. Important to this
study is the correlation coefficients between the measures of Outlets per person and Spatial area
ratio, significant in Pizza Hut and KFC brands at .46 and .32, respectively, but not significant in
Taco Bell (.02), but indicating that each characterizes a separate dimension to market coverage.
Reading “down” across the chains in the first two columns shows the difference in the
measures’ relationship with the three structural measures for the three brands, which are different.
For KFC and Pizza Hut, the proportion of company-owned locations has no relationship on the
coverage measures, whereas, in Taco Bell, there is a significant, positive correlation with both
coverage measures. The number of Franchisees shows Taco Bell with a negative correlation with
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Outlets per person, a similar, significant, positive correlation with the other brands in Spatial area
ratio.
2.4 Results
Tables 4 and 5 provide separate sets of identical regression analyses for the two dependent
variables. Each table contains the results with the three hypothesized independent variables
adjacent to a model with the U.S. Census Division dummy variables. The purpose of these
additional variables is twofold. First, any consistent Census Division effect that shows a significant
difference across the three brands may illustrate a division-specific effect in understanding market
coverage. Second, looking at the regression results within a single table, an inconsistent
hypothesized effect with the different dependent variables can be shown in a more fully-specified
model that is provided by the inclusion of the dummy variables. Adjusted R2, is also included to
show any change in explained variance due to the inclusion of the divisional dummy variables.
Eight divisions are used, with the New England Division left from the analysis.
In Table 4 are the regression results for the Outlets-per-person measure of market coverage.
The results show very low R2s for all three brands without the divisional dummies. Only in the
Taco Bell results are the structural measures results consistent the correlation coefficients, with
the highly significant correlations not significant in the regression modeling. Further, the Multiunit
size measure is not significant in the presence of the divisional dummy variables. The divisional
dummies improved the model R2 by 14 percent in the KFC model, 21 percent in the Pizza Hut
model, and 13% in the Taco Bell model. However, no divisional dummy was consistently
significant across the three brands, indicating no consistent divisional difference in the traditional
measure of coverage. Interpreting this set of results from this dependent measure is difficult. The
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multi-unit size and the number of franchisees were expected to show a positive effect on market
coverage is only significant in the Taco Bell model, without the dummy variables.
Table 5 shows more consistent regression coefficients of the franchise systems’ structural
measures on the Spatial area ratio measure of market coverage. R2s and adjusted R2s are
consistently higher, with 27%, 30%, and 28% of variance explained across KFC, Pizza Hut, and
Taco Bell brands solely on the three hypothesized structural variables. Consistent with the
hypothesized effect of higher coverage from an increased number of more multiunit outlets, and
more franchisees, all regression coefficients are highly significant and positive across the brands.
Opposite to the hypothesized effect, and significantly positive in Taco Bell brand, the effect of
company-owned stores is not shown to be a negative factor in this range-based measure of market
coverage.
The inclusion divisional dummy coefficients was important in increasing variance
explained in Outlets per person coverage models, their effect provides minimal improvement in
the spatial dispersion models, increase R2 by only 3-9% with the eight additional independent
measures. In terms of adjusted R2 the incremental gain in explained variance is smaller, and in the
KFC model, reduces the magnitude of measure.
2.5 Discussion
The study of franchising needs better measures to evaluate the performance its systems in
achieving market coverage. We have presented an additional measure of coverage not confounded
with a number of outlets used its calculation. While we understand that good market coverage is
a goal, we have not had alternative measures to evaluate alternative approaches used in goal
achievement, other than to look at the number of outlets per estimated market demand. This paper
has illustrated the interpretational problems that come from earlier measures of coverage taken
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from selectively distributed shopping goods and tried to apply the same approach to limited service
restaurants. As with any convenience shopping good, locational convenience is required, and
determining an optimal distance between locations is difficult, particularly when neighboring
franchisees are faced with a changing metropolitan market that changes the revenues earned by
better locations. Adding stores that will further encroach without supporting evidence of what the
new store’s effect on a current location’s revenue must be an unpopular request from a franchisor.
Adding stores that increase the reach of the franchising system in the market is beneficial to the
system. Combining impact on revenues with a more reliable measure of coverage, one that
provides more criterion validity would be an improvement.
We advocate the use of geographic coordinates to develop measures better to assist in
relationship between franchisors and franchisees, and that spatial dispersion measures of market
coverage are a more accurate measure of franchise system performance that would lead to superior
financial performance. We also believe that combining these measures with proprietary measures
of location revenue will provide for a better understanding of the revenue potential in a geographic
market. Conversely, if a franchisor remains dependent on outlets per person as a measure of
coverage, it’s not clear what tactic can be followed in changing coverage by reliance on this
measure in achieving overall system revenue.
In the case of the YUM! Brands, the policies of a balanced approach among franchisee and
the franchisor in achieving an optimal dispersion of stores can be shown. Table 6 shows the
locations of the company-owned stores, where these were concentrated within the largest
metropolitan counties, and most likely had the higher sales per location in Table 1. It would be
expected that the locations continue to have superior sales per store, and these new locations may
not have been developed without the persistence of the franchisor to upgrade older facilities and
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pursue better locations, preempting these new locations to be operated by a competing chain. In
contrast to this, from a franchisee’s perspective the increased intrabrand competition, or vertical
competition, in continually adding locations, may have over-stored some markets, and increased
the number of stores returned to the franchisees.
Table 6 provides the 13 largest markets with respect to the number of company-owned
outlets for each of the brand from 2015 and 2016. For each brand, the mean of these top 13
locations with the Spatial area ratio is significantly higher than the average for each brand
provided in Table 2. A different specification comparing these markets with high counts of
company-owned outlets would have shown they are part of a strategy to achieve higher coverage,
although regression results show these stores are of inconsistent importance. Combined with the
higher sales per outlet at company-owned locations (Table 1), franchisees would be skeptical as to
the importance of these stores maintaining coverage, or to the importance of these locations
providing vertical competition. Company-ownership of locations may establish a desired coverage
of selected locations, but it is not consistent with maintaining a healthy demand for new franchisees.
Franchisees are less apt to join a system where their franchisor is both a partner and also their
competitor. Franchisors, for example, as YUM! Brands, have weighed the benefits of franchisorownership of locations against the benefits of offering locations to franchisee ownership, and have
chosen to maintain a healthy system of competing franchisees.
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2.7 Tables and Figures

Note: Hennepin County, MN. Market Coverage: 0.05. Spatial Market Coverage: 0.07. Green
square represents the KFC spatial market coverage. The red square represents the whole market
coverage. Figure was created via ArcMap.
Figure 1: KFC_Hennepin County Spatial Market Coverage

Note: Dallas County, MN. Market Coverage: 0.20. Spatial Market Coverage: 0.88. Green square
represents the KFC spatial market coverage. The red square represents the whole market coverage.
Figure was created via ArcMap.
Figure 2: KFC_Dallas County Spatial Market Coverage
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Table 1: YUM! Brands System-wide Sales and Location Ownership Brands
2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

KFC Sales

24,515

23,242

22,628

23,458

23,147

Franchisee locations
New builds
Closures
Refranchised
Acquired
Franchisee sales
Per location ($000s)

20,819
1,169
(414)
828

19,236
994
(412)
180

18,473
976
(409)
163

22,587
1,085

21,086
1,096

20,437
1,106

17,8941
975
(511)
117
(12)
21,018
1,175

12,647
558
(353)
58
(71)
20,955
1,657

Company-operated locations
New builds
Closures
Company sales
Per location ($000s)

668
102
(13)
1,928
2,886

1,407
114
(39)
2,156
1,532

1,513
120
(35)
2,191
1,448

1,526
106
(27)
2,440
1,599

1,257
101
(23)
2,192
1,744

Pizza Hut Sales

12,034

12,019

11,999

12,106

11,948

Franchisee locations
New builds
Closures
Refranchised
Acquired
Franchisee sales
Per location ($000s)

16,588
1,035
(708)
389

15,871
885
(554)
206

15,334
881
(547)
218

11,749
708

11,526
726

11,398
743

14,8171
915
(479)
90
(44)
11,499
776

12,601
612
(363)
22
(60)
11,345
900

Company owned locations
New builds
Closures
Company sales
Per location ($000s)

160
12
(12)
285
1,781

549
40
(35)
493
898

750
45
(33)
601
801

788
55
(38)
607
770

732
80
(53)
603
824

Taco Bell Sales

10,145

9,660

9,102

8,459

8,307

Franchisee locations
New builds
Closures
Refranchised
Acquired
Franchisee sales
Per location ($000s)

6,196
293
(78)
253

5,513
240
(80)
65
7,558
1,371

5,273
209
(90)
3
(12)
7,005
1,328

5,157
152
(98)
178

8,786
1,418

5,727
263
(95)
46
1
8,120
1,418

Company owned locations
Units--new builds
Closures
Company sales
Per location ($000s)

653
21
0
1,359
2,081

885
34
(4)
1,540
1,740

900
37
(5)
1,544
1,716

933
27
(1)
1,454
1,558

891
27
(2)
1,474
1,654

6,833
1,325

Note: Sales in $millions, except per location data ($000s). In 2014, KFC and Pizza Hut units in
China were reclassified as franchisee units in the system-wide reports.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Counts for Metropolitan Counties by Brand
Minimum

Metro county/parish Outlets Maximum

Metro county/parish

Outlets Mean

Std. deviation

.051
.00
0%
0
0

Hennepin, MN
Orleans, LA
Orleans, LA
Travis, TX
Travis, TX

2
1
1
5
5

.509
.950
100%
37
36

Lubbock, TX
Cook, IL
Salt Lake, UT
Maricopa, AZ
Los Angeles, CA

7
50
15
38
110

.235
.477
12%
4.740
2.920

.103
.238
23%
5.328
3.693

.125
.013

Kings, NY
Washtenaw, MI

8
3

1.156
.990

Sedgwick, KS
Kern, CA

20
14

.442
.632

.196
.233

% Company-owned

0%

Washtenaw, MI

3

91%

East Baton Rouge, LA 10

7.7%

15%

Multiunit Size
Franchisees
Observations:153
Taco Bell
Outlets per person
Spatial area ratio
% Company-owned
Multiunit Size
Franchisees
Observations:155

1
1

Albany, NY
Albany, NY

4
4

23
18

Hidalgo, TX
Los Angeles, CA

24
209

5.539
3.420

3.393
2.332

.049
.014
0%
0
0

New York, NY
New York, NY
New York, NY
Kern, CA
Kern, CA

3
3
3
21
21

.864
.970
100%
23
34

Onondaga, NY
Orange, CA
Kern, CA
Travis, TX
Clark, NV

12
64
21
26
52

.416
.632
20%
4.778
3.920

.171
.203
22%
3.918
4.191

KFC
Outlets per person
Spatial area ratio
% Company-owned
Multiunit Size
Franchisees
Observations:154
Pizza Hut
Outlets per person
Spatial area ratio
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Note: Maximum number of franchised outlets with minimum for a franchisee measure.

Table 3: Correlation Coefficients of Dependent and Independent Measures
(1)
KFC
(1) Outlets per person
(2) Spatial area ratio
(3) % Company-owned
(4) Multiunit size
(5) Franchisees
(6) Population
Observations:154

Pizza Hut
(1) Outlets per person
(2) Spatial area ratio
(3) % Company-owned
(4) Multiunit size
(5) Franchisees
(6) Population
Observations:153

Taco Bell
(1) Outlets per person
(2) Spatial area ratio
(3) % Company-owned
(4) Multiunit size
(5) Franchisees
(6) Population
Observations:155

(2)

.324
-.009
.043
.045
-.218

3

.460
.010
.129
.165
-.212

3

.022
.227
.132
-.144
-.308

3

2
3

3

3
3

-.017
.305
.346
.417

.041
.415
.436
.306

.223
.151
.328
.354

(3)

3
3
3

3
3
3

(4)

-.246
-.032
.098

3

-.209
-.001
-.031

3

-.290
-.072
-.031

3

-.209
.256

.113
.438

(5)

3
3

.753

3

3

.719

3

.709

3

2
1
3
3

Note: 1 p<.1; 2 <.05; 3 p<.01
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-.227
.070

3

Table 4: Outlets per Person Measure of Market Coverage Regressed on Structural Characteristics of U.S. Yum Brand Systems
Standardized Regression Coefficients and t-Values
KFC

b

25

(Constant)
% Company-owned
Multiunit size
Franchisees
East North Central
East South Central
Middle Atlantic
Mountain
Pacific
South Atlantic
West North Central
West South Central
R2
Adjusted R 2
Observations

t
14.74
-.01 -.08
.04 .43
.04 .49

.00
-.02

Note: 1 p<.1; 2 <.05; 3 p<.01

b
3

.04
.11
.04
-.07
.12
-.13
-.17
-.32
-.22
-.15
-.32

t
6.04
.44
1.24
.53
-.36
.96
-.84
-1.28
-1.96
-1.18
-1.11
-2.00

.14
.08
154

Pizza Hut
b
t
9.81
.02 .18
.08 .94
.12 1.49

2

2

.02
.00
154

b
3

.00
.02
.10
.40
.34
.24
.28
.11
.49
.54
.44

t
2.63
.03
.25
1.32
2.27
2.89
1.58
2.14
.71
2.68
4.06
2.71

2
3

2

3
3
3

.10
.08

.23
.17
153

3

Taco Bell
b
T
10.46
.28
3.41
.19
2.33
-.08 -.99

153

b
3
3
2

t
4.68
.20 2.42
.10 1.13
-.10 -1.30
.27 1.49
.20 1.70
-.11 -.70
.12 .97
.07 .43
-.03 -.19
.19 1.39
.05 .32
.23
.17

155

155

3
2

1

Table 5: Spatial Area Ratio of Market Coverage Regressed on Structural Characteristics of U.S. Yum Brand Systems
Standardized Regression Coefficients and t-Values
KFC, n=154
! t
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(Constant)
% Company-owned
Multiunit size
Franchisees
East North Central
East South Central
Middle Atlantic
Mountain
Pacific
South Atlantic
West North Central
West South Central
R2
Adjusted R 2
Observations

.09
.42
.43

9.66
1.31
5.60
6.04

.27
.26

Note: 1 p<.1; 2 <.05; 3 p<.01

!
3

3
3

.09
.43
.44
.21
.14
.10
.09
.08
.24
.12
.08

t
2.08
1.22
5.34
5.94
1.27
1.25
.66
.78
.56
1.41
.97
.54

.30
.24
154

3

3
3

Pizza Hut, n=153
! t
9.27 3
.12 1.67 1
.38 5.34 3
.38 5.55 3

.30
.29
154

!
.11
.34
.37
.33
.20
.19
.21
.21
.52
.27
.22

t
2.24
1.62
4.73
5.57
2.10
1.94
1.43
1.79
1.49
3.23
2.25
1.53

.39
.34
153

2

3
3

Taco Bell, n=155
! t
11.32 3
.36 4.86 3
.35 4.70 3
.43 6.03 3

2

3
2

.28
.26
153

!
.35
.28
.39
-.10
.01
-.26
.02
.06
-.07
-.03
-.13

t
5.88
4.72
3.48
5.35
-.59
.11
-1.88
.16
.44
-.40
-.23
-.92

.35
.30
155

155

3
3
3
3

Table 6: Highest Number of Company-Owned Outlet Counties and Spatial Ratio
Spatial
ratio
KFC
Harris County, Texas
Franklin County, Ohio
Miami-Dade County, Florida
Orange County, Florida
Salt Lake County, Utah
Oklahoma County, Oklahoma
Marion County, Indiana
Broward County, Florida
Duval County, Florida
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Los Angeles County, California
Travis County, Texas
Williamson County, Texas
Mean (Overall: .48)
Observations: 154
Pizza Hut
Dallas County, Texas
Tarrant County, Texas
Montgomery County, Ohio
Harris County, Texas
East Baton Rouge Parish,
Louisiana
Collin County, Texas
Chatham County, Georgia
Cobb County, Georgia
Orange County, Florida
Cuyahoga County, Ohio
Gwinnett County, Georgia
DeKalb County, Georgia
Jefferson County, Alabama
Mean (Overall: .63)
Observations: 153
Taco Bell
Harris County, Texas
Miami-Dade County, Florida
Wayne County, Michigan
Dallas County, Texas
Oakland County, Michigan
Kern County, California
Los Angeles County, California
Broward County, Florida
Marion County, Indiana
Shelby County, Tennessee
Douglas County, Nebraska
Genesee County, Michigan
Oklahoma County, Oklahoma
Mean (Overall: .63)
Observations: 155

area
Outlets

Companyowned

Franchisees

Franchisee
outlets

.74
.74
.92
.46
.67
.53
.59
.53
.52
.47
.74
.18
.38
.57

53
24
37
19
15
15
18
23
15
18
110
5
6

33
22
20
17
15
15
13
12
12
9
6
5
4

13
1
9
2
0
0
2
2
2
6
36
0
2

20
2
17
2
0
0
5
11
3
9
104
0
2

.90
.97
.83
.95
.68

81
68
15
145

36
30
13
11
10

14
6
2
9

45
38
2
134

1

1

.89
.71
.82
.78
.88
.88
.81
.84
.84

41
9
26
53
43
27
20
26

9
7
6
5
5
5
5
4

12
1
4
8
5
3
3
3

32
2
20
48
38
22
15
22

.79
.81
.87
.93
.83
.75
.89
.77
.81
.86
.89
.77
.69
.82

100
44
41
61
42
21
169
32
39
31
18
17
29

33
25
24
23
21
21
20
20
18
18
17
16
14

8
8
8
13
10
0
32
4
2
3
1
1
3

67
19
17
38
21
0
149
12
21
13
1
1
15

11

Note: 1 p<.1; 2 <.05; 3 p<.01
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3. Chapter 2 Market Coverage, Ownership, and Outlet Survival: Evidence from the U.S.
Fast-Food Industry
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the success of business locations is valuable for entrepreneurs and
researchers. The location survival rate is not only crucial for the site owner but also critical for the
retailing and franchising systems. For example, independent KFC owners need 1.2 million to 2.2
million dollars to set up a new location and invest 45,000 as an upfront fee to the KFC company.
That means if one independent franchisee location failed, the startup cost would become the
location owner’s sunk cost1, including the initial nonrefundable franchise fee. For the franchisor,
royalties will also be lost from the KFC franchising system’s pocket. The losses for KFC are not
the unique case in the franchising industry, for example, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and Subway, also
face the same severe economic loss. For three Yum! Brands with company-owned stores, KFC,
Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut lost 440 (10%), 537 (7%), and 867 (9%) stores, respectively, from the
year 2015 to 2020. In addition, Subway lost 2,400 outlets (9%, Table 1), which means the losses
only come from upfront fees from these four chains emerging from 19 billion to 36 billion dollars.
Given the significant loss for both the individual site and franchise system, it raises my
attention to explore the factors that affect the location failure rate.
However, the existing studies on survival or failure rate often focus on the new firm or
upstream, franchisor firm (Shane, 2001; Shane & Foo, 1999; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1998; Shane,
1998; Stanworth et al., 1998; Shane, 1996). For example, researchers explored what theories,
economic cycles, and economic-scale development stages are efficient when explaining new firms'
survival rates (Cook et al., 2012; Shane & Foo, 1999; Martin, 1988). Franchise contract factors are

1

Sunk cost means a cost that has already been spent and cannot be recovered.
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another hot debate part of the new franchise system survival field. Shane (1998) argued that the
initial investment, company age, and size negatively affect the new franchise systems' failure rate.
Obviously, these existent studies ignore to examine the overall survival rate (Acs, Armington &
Zhang, 2007); that is the location survival rate in the franchising and retailing industry.
Franchise Unit Survival
The latest International Franchise Association surveys (Mason, 2020) showed that five
years after start-up, there are only 8% of these franchise systems existing in the US market.
According to our data, the location’s failure rate of the three Yum! Brands, Subway, and
McDonald’s are around 9%. This proposed study will examine this location survival rate and the
factors of ownership and market coverage that affect it, which up to this point, have not been
thoroughly addresses.
To address these research gaps, the purpose of this study is to examine what factors lead to
the mature franchise site’s survival? How do these factors affect the location's survival rate? I use
a unique longitudinal data of the five most prominent fast-food restaurants, KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco
Bell, Subway, and McDonald’s, of the United States from 2015 to 2019 to explore these effects.
These systems are mature, and have been so for over 20 years. For example, McDonald’s is
approaching 70s years old, and Subway, is over 50 years old. These chains has had to modernize
locations, and change coverage with their markets growth, and shift to an emphasis on drivethrough locations.
Market coverage is an inherent goal of franchise systems, as the value of the franchise
brands is only realized by patrons selecting the brand at multiple locations (Stassen & Zhang,
2019). The bigger the market coverage, the higher the brand recognition. To pursue this positive
externality effect from the market coverage, the franchise system expands markets by increasing
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the number of stores. During this developing process, the site owners would like to develop better
locations to increase the customers’ patronage (Ghosh & Craig, 1986), profit possibilities (Parsa
et al., 2011), projected performance (Mason, Mayer & Ezell, 1988; Poers, 1997) and the location
survival duration (Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2013). As the market coverage grows and locations
clustered together, the intrabrand competition becomes severe, and sales cannibalization hurts the
survival rate of all individual sites and franchising systems. Keep the above point in mind, as
maturing franchising systems (as these are now all nearing 60 years of age), the coverage for a
market has changed as the market changes, such that adding new stores is required, and that
overstoring markets becomes inevitable.
While the topic of market coverage is essential to location survival rate, no studies at this
point have examined the effect of the spatial market coverage on location survival rate. I extended
the spatial market converge created by Stassen and Zhang (2019) by keeping the geographical
dispersion of locations and adding the local market demand and punishment weight of interdistances between locations. Our new spatial market coverage improves the conventional market
coverage by including its demand element, as well as involving location distribution and exclusive
territory. Thus, it provides a more accurate and complete description of location coverage and high
criterion validity, so that discloses a clear relationship between spatial market coverage and
location survival rate.
Much of the work on survival rate has assumed that survival heavily relies on the assets
owned by entrepreneurs and franchisors. Given this implicit assumption, many scholars who work
on the research of survival have logically incorporated Penrose's (1959) observation that the
managerial capacity constrains a firm's survival or failure. This constraint is overcome in the
franchising system because franchisors obtain labor and capital by recruiting franchisees
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(Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968/69) and simultaneously economize
monitoring costs to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection (Lafontaine, 1992; Brickley, Dark
& Weisbach, 1991; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Franchisors save substantial start-up costs by hiring
franchisees so that the scarcity of funding and managerial talents is solved. By increasing firm
asset size, franchisors can develop the franchising system more rapidly and also enhance the
probability that company-owned outlets will survive (Holmberg & Morgan, 2003).
Alternative Perspectives on Franchise Unit Survival
Currently, four different perspectives exist which provide advantages to independent
franchisee ownership of locations within a system. These are considered advantages over the full
use of company-owned locations. A large number of franchisee units within a system would lead
to a higher survival rate than locations are completed operated by companies.
According to the agency theory, the reduction of the monitoring cost of location managers
is greater than with franchisees (Lafontaine, 1992; Brickley, Dark & Weisbach, 1991; Fama &
Jensen, 1983). First, franchisees play as residual claimants whose goal aligns with franchisors', not
the employees who are compensated through wages and have divergent goals from franchisors.
Outlet managers have incentives to skirt and increase the managerial costs by enjoying more
leisure time, having large offices or buying corporate jets, so that jeopardizes the value of the
location—than would be an employee. Second, franchisors have more information about
franchisees compared to location managers. Eisenhardt (1988) argued that if an pincipal has more
information about an agent, the agent is less likely to shirk or misrepresent abilities. Therefore, the
cost of monitoring franchisees is less than monitoring location agents—the probability of
franchisors' survival increases as the capital upsurges and monitoring cost declines.
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Transaction Costs Reduction
Related to the reduction in agency costs, franchising is an effective way to internalizing the
transaction costs by vertical integration (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; Blair, Roger & Roger, 1983).
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) found that this vertical integration organization, such as franchise
systems, have more powerful control and monitoring mechanisms than markets. Franchising
systems can provide long-term rewards that create convergent goals between franchisors and
franchisees that reduce the payoff from opportunistic behavior. This risk-sharing organization
form reduces the costs for both franchisors and franchisees result in longer survival length for
company-owned outlets.
Franchisees' transaction costs decrease as the vertical integration organization form; thus,
the franchisees' profits increase (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Blair, Roger & Roger, 1983) may lead
to the lower failure rate. This particular business organization provides convenience for knowledge
transferring from one location to another (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). Franchisees accept franchisors'
ongoing managerial advice and knowledge that includes location selection, recruit, and training
experiences (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; Christina & Jim, 1997).
Knowledge Transfer
Compared to independent firms, this transferable knowledge improves franchisees,
especially independent franchisee's survival rates (Ingram & Baum, 1997; Castrogiovanni, Justis
& Julian, 1993; Justis, Castrogiovanni & Chan, 1992). This high survival rate will attract more
independent companies to join the franchise system. The more independent franchised outlets, the
bigger the spatial market coverage of the franchising system (Stassen & Zhang, 2019). The
expansion of the spatial market coverage will increase customers repurchase frequencies, so that
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induce the positive externality that is the increased brand recognition. High brand recognition may
lead to the high independent franchised outlet survival rate.
Multi-unit Franchising
Franchisees who own, operate, or control more than one outlet is known as multi-unit
franchisees. New franchisee units are launched sequentially by multi-unit franchisees or launched
by master franchisees who are responsible for developing a market area.

Compared to

independent franchisees, multi-unit franchisees have occupied a large proportion of the market
share in many different industry areas, especially the fast-food franchising system (Stanworth &
Curran, 1999; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann, 1995; Kaufmann & Lafontaine, 1994). The
advantage of multi-unit franchisees is that operation knowledge, local market demand information
can be spread among these units faster and more accurately (Porter, 2008; Kalnins & Lafontaine,
2004). Master franchisees and sub-franchisees with this knowledge advantage, can locate their
new franchise outlets appropriate by minimizing encroachment problems so that control high intrabrand competition (Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996) and overstored problem.
Multi-unit franchisees as experienced franchisees decrease the system and unit failure rate by
building organizational routines (Shane, 1998, 1996) and replicating organizations to fit local
markets (Winter et al., 2012), respectively. Multi-unit franchisees' outlets are an efficient way to
improve the probability of location survival rate.
Subway exists as an exceptional franchising system which has no company-owned units
(Fulop & Forward, 1997) but only owns independent franchisees and multi-unit franchisees.
Mitenko (1991) argued in his franchise failure study that many questions may arise because no
company-owned units can lead franchisees to manage stores. This finding coincides with
Holmberg and Morgan's (2003) finding, which found that those with no company-owned units had
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the highest franchisee failure rates. However, our empirical study shows that the market
performance of Subway is not worse than any other franchise brand which owns franchisor outlets.
The location survival rate of Subway is 9%, which is a little bit lower than KFC and Pizza Hut's
10% rate. Therefore, the location survival and failure rates about the franchise system without any
company-owned outlets are undecided. I will be the first one to examine the effect of all franchised
outlets on the locations' survival rate.
This paper organizes in the following manner: the second section describes the franchising
organization format and explores how spatial market coverage and different franchise ownership
affect the location’s survival rate. The third section of the article describes the methodology
applied to test these relationships. The fourth section describes the results of this research. The
fifth section discusses the results and implications of this study.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
3.2.1 Market Coverage
Market coverage is a fundamental objective for franchise chains because it discloses how
much a franchise brand covers the market. The broader market coverage leads to higher brand
recognition (Nyadzayo et al.,2011). Brand recognition is an essential and powerful aspect that
affects business, and it is also a reason why franchise chains develop rabidly (Bohi, 2010). For
example, most franchisors operate a number of company-owned sites in their systems at the early
stage to reveal their profitable future so that to attract potential franchisees. These prospective
franchisees can take advantage of the existing brand name and enjoy the benefits of the positive
externality of the excellent reputation build by the franchisors and existing franchisees after it joins
the franchise system. This existing brand recognition attracts more independent firms involve in
the franchise chains, and this procedure promotes the rapid development of chain enterprises.
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"Brand recognition is developed by reach, frequency, and consistency" ("Brand
Recognition," Shiao, 2019, para 3). Therefore, to make sure customers realize the franchise brand,
build and recall the franchise brand knowledge, patronage the brand at multiple locations becomes
very important (Stassen & Zhang, 2019). To pursue high brand recognition by improving market
coverage, most franchise chains choose to expand markets by increasing the number of outlets.
Franchisors recruit franchisees to start up new locations, and independent firms involve in the
franchise systems voluntarily because of the attraction of the positive externality of the existing
brand recognition.
In this process, all the location owners want to take suitable locations to raise the customers’
patronage (Ghosh & Craig, 1986), profit possibilities (Parsa et al., 2011), projected performance
(Mason et al., 1988; Poers, 1997) and extend the location survival length (Kalnins & Lafontaine,
2013). Due to these franchisees’ incentives, it is highly possible for them to increase the market
coverage blindly and locate all outlets together. Thereby, the intra-brand competition becomes
severe, and sales cannibalization hurts the survival rate of all individual sites and the whole
franchise system.
To avoid this inherent defect of the traditional market coverage measure, researchers begin
to explore a new and valid measure of market coverage (Stassen and Zhang 2019). They argued
that the new measure should emphasize the spatial distribution of each outlet so that to control the
encroachment problem in the franchise system. This new spatial market coverage would be
beneficial to both franchisors and franchisees by controlling the overstored problem.
In this section, I describe the existing studies on market coverage and spatial market
coverage. I compared these two measures, point out the shortcomings of the existing measures and
potential development direction.

35

Traditional market coverage
Conventionally, market coverage is defined as a ratio of enterprises per the market’s
demand, or a number of potential shoppers in the market (Blair & LaFontaine, 2005). This
traditional market coverage is calculated as a ratio and appropriately be used to evaluate market
saturation (Stassen & Zhang, 2019). If the market coverage is very high, which means this brand
is likely overstored or saturated in the market; thereby, the saturated market risks reducing sales
per store, increasing the likelihood of locations’ underperforming, as well as reducing the demand
for new sites under the same brand. This approach by sacrificing the sales and demand of the outlet
unit to pursue the high market coverage would lead to the high failure rate of locations.
This phenomenon of excessive storage is widespread in the franchise chain industry and
retail industry. Subway shut down 500 locations in 2018 due to its overstored in some markets
after it closed 800 outlets in 2017 in the U.S. (White, 2018). The big data department of Walmart
announced that the biggest competitor in the market is itself because its overstored markets
cannibalize the sales of nearby outlets (Russo, 2019).
Existing franchisees will want the value of the investment made in their locations to remain
robust and unaffected by the increased intrabrand competition. In order to ensure that franchisees
have full confidence in chain enterprises, franchisors must balance the needs for sufficient market
coverage while maintaining a continued demand for additional outlets and control encroachment
among franchisees (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005).
Research on market coverage is not abundant, and more have been addressed on higher
search product. In the case of home electronics, manufacturers believed strong brands could
sustain limited distribution per market (Frazier & Lassar, 1996). Some researchers explored how
market structures affect market coverage (Bental & Spiegel, 1995). Their finding showed that the
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competitive market has a more extensive market coverage compared to the cartel market. Yang
and Ye (2008) also found that the more competitive market leads to more extensive market
coverage and diversified customer types.
Other existing studies showed that franchise ownerships affect the market coverage during
the different development periods of the franchise system (Stassen & Zhang, 2019; Dant,
Kaufmann, & Paswan, 1992; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). In the early stages of the development of
the franchise industry, franchisors seek to expand market coverage by recruiting more franchisees,
which maximizes their revenues of royalties and upfront fees to rise their franchisee system’s sales
(Blair & Lafontaine, 2005). As the franchise system grows in locations, resources, and experience,
franchisors’ have higher incentives to buy back locations with superior performance from
franchisees, and meanwhile, franchisees exit the system through non-renewal (Oxenfeldt & Kelly,
1969). Thereby, the market coverage of a mature franchise system would support a large portion
of company-owned units. Dant et al. (1992) found that franchisors have increased their dependence
on multiunit franchisees to extend the market.
However, the extant research on achieving market coverage is limited validity, because it
is reported as the number of outlets per person or households. This typical approach of market
coverage lack criterion validity because it does not incorporate the importance of the spatial
separation of outlets.
For a high search product, such as fast-food restaurants, multiple locations in a market
guaranteed the potential high brand recognition. Besides the number of locations, there are many
other varieties, such as distance between customers’ locations to retail stores, drive-thru time, and
waiting time, affect the patronage rate. In short, having outlet visibility of competing formats is
likely more important today than the benefits assured from the exclusivity of a territory or location
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in terms of the number of stores or size of the population. Both franchisors and franchisees would
benefit from a novel spatial market coverage, which includes market demand, and travel distances
between customers and retail locations.
Spatial market coverage
While the topic of spatial market coverage is essential to the franchise and retail industry,
few studies at this point have examined the spatial dimension across geographic markets. Existing
related studies were focused on the descriptive research of geographic distribution or spatial
clusters, and the economic and financial effects resulting from these two geographic factors.
Garcia and Norli (2012) created a measure of geographic dispersion (GNGD measure) of
a firm utilizing data from 10-K reports. They classified firms into two different spatial dispersion
groups: geographically dispersed or locally based on if a large number of states were mentioned
in the annual report or not (Garcia and Norli 2012). This spatial distribution measure is prevalent
in the financial field. Shi, Sun, and Luo (2015) argued that compared to geographically
concentrated firms, those geographically dispersed firms have lower accrual-based management
but higher real earnings management by employing the GNGD measure. Platikanova and Mattei
(2016) used the GNGD measure to explore the relationship between geographic dispersion and
future earning predication. Their study showed that geographically similar corporations have more
precise earnings forecasts because their information costs are low.
Geographic dispersion of business has been shown to play an important role regarding firm
value (Gao et al., 2008; Kang & Kim, 2008), stock returns (Garcia & Norli, 2012), company
finance and management policymaking (Shi, Sun & Luo 2015; Almazan et al., 2010; Becker et al.,
2011; Landier et al., 2009), and accurate earnings conjectures (Platikanova & Mattei, 2016).
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Geographically dispersed assets have a positive effect on firm economic performance (Delios &
Beamish, 1999; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999).
Stassen and Zhang (2019) created an initial spatial market coverage measure based on the
concept of geographic dispersion by employing cross-sectional data of three Yum Brands in the
United States. Compared to the traditional market coverage and GNGD measure, which have been
limited in descriptions of store locations (Stassen & Grunhagen, 2016, 2011), the proxy of the
spatial market coverage provides validity when regressed on structural characteristics within the
franchise system as well as the visibility of the market competition. Their new spatial market
coverage measure, to some extent, described the outlets’ spatial distribution situation by
introducing geographic information. The geographic location, also known as “geodata,” is
collected and transferred from simple street address information; thus, the accurate data provide a
real description of the spatial distribution of the brand and market.
Geographically similar firms, most of the time, are clustered together. Clusters can help a
region to compete and to maintain or increase the economic growth rate (Alcácer & Chung, 2014;
Bennett, Graham & Bratton, 1999; Porter, 1990). Cluster economies can save searching cost
because the cluster theory rests critically on the idea that knowledge spillovers remain within local
industry clusters (Audretsch, 2000; Dunning, 2000; Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 1998; Martin &
Sunley, 1996). The larger the local business system, the lower the operating cost (Marshall, 2009;
Martin, 1988a, 1988b). Intellectual capital information is easier to spread in the clustered locations.
This knowledge flow attract more firms within the same industry to locate close to each other
(Humphreys & Matti, 2018; Casson, 1998). This cluster economies reduce the firm’s information
asymmetry and meanwhile improve brand recognition (Garcia & Norli, 2012; Merton, 1987).
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Moreover, as Barney (1991) suggested, a geographical cluster is an element that can
contribute to the physical capital of the organization. For example, fast-food franchise chain
growth across territories can lead to the development of a strong presence and create barriers to
entry for competitors. Consequently, the geographical location that may, in the long run, enhance
the competitive position of the franchise system. Geographic clusters can also control free-riding
behaviors (Brickley & Dark, 1987) by adjusting the monitoring cost on franchisees and outlet
managers. The longer the geographic distance between upstream and downstream, the higher the
monitoring costs (Norton, 1988). Therefore, the more geographically concentrated its franchise
system, the more the system can economize on monitoring costs (Shane, 1998).
However, as a franchise system become mature, outlets geographically close to each other
tend to introduce severe intrabrand competition (Blair & LaFontaine, 2005). Conflict is created
when franchisors attempt to penetrate markets with new outlets to increase system sales. This
expanding strategy negatively affect the sales and profits of existing franchisees. This phenomenon
is defined as territorial encroachment, which will cannibalize outlets’ sales within the brands
(Kalnins, 2004; Stassen & Mittelstaedt, 1995).
To address the encroachment problem and manage channel conflict, franchisors typically
include clauses about exclusive territory when they draft a franchise contract (Nair, Tikoo & Liu,
2009; Blair & Lafontaine, 2002; Azoulay & Shane, 2001; Stassen & Mittelstaedt, 1995). The
exclusive territory policy protects the profits of the existing outlets by introducing a fixed mile
radius around the incumbent openings to keep new franchisees away from the local market
(Kaufmann & Rangan, 1990). The IFA Educational Foundation discovered that 80% restaurant
industry and 69% fast-food industry offered territorial restrictions policy in 1998; the overall rate
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of the exclusive territories is 73% (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005). This average exclusive rate
increased to 83.5% in 2001 (Shane, 2001).
The existing studies showed that the optimal trade area for fast-food restaurants is two to
three miles (Anderson, 1984; Zeller et al., 1980; Claus & Hardwick, 1972). Salomon Brothers
(1977) reported that 80% of McDonald’s customers would like to patronize an outlet within three
miles. The initial version of the anti-encroachment policy stipulated that a three-mile radius was
an exclusive territory to guarantee that franchisors would not open a new unit within this area
(Blair & Lafontaine, 2002). The exclusive territory policy reduces the conflicts that existed in the
franchise system, as well as increase the chances of success of a franchisee (Libava, 2018).
To sum up, when the enterprise enjoys the benefits brought by the geographical cluster,
entrepreneurs should not forget to control the encroachment issue. In other words, the spatial
market coverage measure created by Stassen and Zhang (2019) provides an accurate geographical
distribution description of the business, but it lacks control over the intra-brand competition.
Furthermore, as I discussed above, the advantage of the traditional market coverage is that it
discloses the local market demand and raises brand recognition. In this paper, I would like to
extend the spatial coverage by emerging the exclusive territory information and market demand.
The updated spatial market coverage can not only ensure the positive externalities result from the
agglomeration economies, reduce the loss caused by vicious competition but also consider the
local demand.
In summary, the traditional market coverage, which measured by sales per store, or
saturation can only lead to the over-stored problem; on the other hand, spatial market coverage
reveals not only the market saturation level but also the geographical distribution of outlets.
Thereby, we believe that our spatial market coverage measure has higher predictability compared
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to the traditional market coverage. The higher the spatial distribution, the greater is the concern
for the intrabrand competition, the more severe outlet unit sales cannibalization. According to the
reasons illustrated above, I develop the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a: The lower a spatial market coverage of a franchise system, the higher the
probability of the location survival rate.
Hypothesis 1b: The higher a spatial market coverage of a franchise system, the lower the
probability of the location survival rate.
3.2.2 Franchise ownership
Franchising
Franchising is an institutional business form in which two parties, the franchisor (a parent
organization) and the franchisee (a local company), build a contract between each other. This
franchising contract describes both parties’ rights and obligations; that is, a franchisee pays a lump
sum fee and ongoing royalty payments to obtain the right to sell a brand product or service created
by a franchisor, and a franchisor provide managerial assistance to a franchisee as a return (Blair &
Lafontaine, 2005; Miller & Grossman, 1990; Rubin, 1978). Franchisors’ managerial assistance
includes providing location selection advice, periodical training, ongoing advertising assistance,
and operating procedures guidance to operate local stores (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005; Child, 1987).
The franchising contract is a bilateral relational contract that allows franchisors to sell their
trade names and business models in place of constructing new locations and lets franchisees
perform as an entrepreneur to operate units by following franchisors’ operating procedures (Dwyer
& Oh, 1988). Therefore, franchising works as a hybrid organization format that the franchise
relationship is in-between a single company and a market transaction (Williamson, 1991).
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Franchising, as a hybrid business organization, typically engage in operating some
locations directly and franchise the rest. For example, at the beginning of 2020, KFC had 4,045
restaurants in the United States. Some 317, or eight percent of them, were company-owned and
operated. Pizza Hut owned 7,568 outlets, and 15% of them are company-owned locations. The
majority of franchisors, however, operate a smaller proportion of their outlets directly.
As the number of franchised stores increases, the spatial market coverage of chains also
increases. This causes stores to cluster together, and competition between outlets continue to
intensify. The sales per store may decrease, but the benefits brought by the franchise system (i.e.,
low transaction costs, advertising suggestions, etc.) make franchisees have a higher tolerance.
Further, the independent franchisees compared to franchisors, have disadvantages to select
locations (Rubin, 1978); while the franchisors take the superior geographical areas, most
independent franchisees outlets dispersed at the marginal places of the market. Thereby, with the
higher tolerance and lower spatial market coverage, the survival rates of independent franchisees
stores are higher than the company-owned outlets.
Company-owned stores are vertically integrated so that the transaction costs are
internalized. Franchisors employ various vertical restraints (i.e., lump-sum franchise fees and
royalties on sales) that may allow upstream firms (i.e., franchisors) to emulate the vertically
integrated outcome (i.e., company ownership) without in fact resorting to vertical integration.
Williamson (1979) argued that this hybrid organization which relies on relational franchise
contract could reduce transaction cost by controlling the uncertainty, such as incident and
unexpected consequence caused by asymmetric information, human beings’ bounded rationality
and opportunism, between two parties.
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Asymmetry information is referred to there is an imbalance position between two parties
due to one party has more or better information compared to another. This kind of asymmetry
may arise many problems, for example, recruiting employees whose skills mismatch the position
requirements, or even lead to the market failure. However, these problems resulted from
asymmetry information are alleviated in the franchise system. One reason is that the Information
and knowledge transfer are more convenient and faster in the vertical integration institution
(Atalay, Hortacsu & Syverson, 2014; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004); and another reason is that the longterm contract between upstream and downstream reduce the uncertainty in the product delivery
process while holding the cost at a certain level.
Simon (1982) proposed the concept of bounded rationality to point out the limits of human
being’s thinking capacity resulted from the shortage of information and time. Bounded rationality
makes it is impossible for two parties in the organization to consider everything, especially all
contingency issues, when they make contracts. Opportunism means that one party may violate (all)
contracts and maximize his or her own welfares. Therefore, the mixture of bounded rationality and
opportunistic behavior will surge the cost of drafting the contract beforehand, revising the
agreement during the business process, and addressing the unpredicted troubles after they happen.
This hybrid organizational format and the bilateral relational contract provide benefits for
franchise system to lower down the transaction costs between franchisors and franchisees (Blair
& Lafontaine, 2005; Dwyer & Oh, 1988) by sharing uncertainty. These reasons lead to the higher
survival rate of individual franchisee outlets compared to the company-owned outlets.
Agency Theory
In most modern establishments, the owners (principles) are not the direct executives of
business, and they hire managers (agents) who are responsible for the daily business operation.
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This separation of ownership and management is referred to as the Agency Theory (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Business owners always want to maximize the company’s profits; however,
agents would like to maximize their utility. Thus, some decisions made by agents may divergent
away from owners’ interests cause different priorities and interests.
Due to this uncertainty situation, business owners cannot be sure that the hired managers
are acting in their interests without sustaining supervision. This condition arouses two problems
that the owners face: adverse selection and moral hazard (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Adverse
selection occurs when the owners cannot ascertain if the managers misrepresent their true abilities
(Eisenhardt, 1988). Moral hazard exists when the owners cannot be sure if the agents put their
maximal effort to work or are shirking (Eisenhardt, 1988).
Business owners are compensated through residual claimancy on the assets of the company,
and agents are remunerated through fixed wages, diverse purposes drive each, therefore, may
perform in distinct behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1988). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that Agency
theory can be used to address the agency problems by assigning residual claimancy to agents and
invest more monitoring costs to force agents to align the same goals with principles.
Agency theory has been well developed in chain enterprises because it helps franchisors to
save tons of monitoring cost. The first solution to Agency theory that is replaced wage contracts
with residual claimancy provides franchisors an excellent way to motivate franchisees. Because
the harder the franchisees work, the higher a share of the profits they may have; any leisure
franchisees consumed will lead to the actual cost. As the residual claimant, franchisees have less
incentive to shirk compared agents, so that reduces the moral hazard problems (Lafontaine, 1992;
Brickley & Dark, 1987; Jensen, 1983; Rubin, 1978).
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The second solution of Agency theory requires entrepreneurs to collect more information
about agents’ behaviors so that it becomes harder for agents to shirk or misrepresent abilities
(Eisenhardt, 1988). However, this choice of preference creates an incentive for the less qualified
to misrepresent their abilities to obtain employment. This adverse selection requires entrepreneurs
to incur costs to differentiate more qualified applicants from the less qualified (Levinthal, 1988).
To guarantee a firm survival or grows faster in a competitive market, entrepreneurs need
to hire more employees whom the entrepreneurs do not have enough previous information (Faith,
Higgins, & Tollison, 1984). This asymmetry information gives rise to the higher cost for
entrepreneurs in gathering information. Moreover, when a company is struggling to survive or
eager to expand the market, an entrepreneur as a boundary rationality person has less time to
evaluate new employees. To avoid mismatches between jobs and capabilities when an observation
window is short, the business owner has to raise higher costs to determine the capabilities of the
new personnel (Prescott & Visscher, 1980).
These reasons that lead to the adverse selection problem can exist because the punishment
to the unqualified managers is too low. However, this misrepresentative cost for independent
entrepreneurs, like franchisees, is high. Franchisees join a franchise system that needs to invest a
vast initial lump-sum fee; for example, KFC requires 45,000 dollars, and Pizza Hut demands
between 297,000 and 2,109,000 dollars. If franchise units failed, these individual entrepreneurs
need to bear this sunk cost2 alone. Thus, unqualified franchisees have little incentives to pretend
themselves as qualified candidates to enroll in the franchising system. From this perspective, a
franchise can alleviate the problem of adverse selection.

A sunk cost (also known as retrospective cost) is a cost that has already been incurred and cannot
be recovered.
2
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Furthermore, Spence (1973) argued that individuals with above-average capabilities have
an incentive to signal those capabilities to others. In franchising, qualified individuals can signal
their capabilities by buying outlets. By buying a franchised outlet, an individual agrees to be
compensated by the uncertain residual claim on the profits of that outlet. If the individual is
qualified, this residual claimancy will provide a better return than the average wage rate paid to an
employee. However, if the individual is not qualified, the compensation from residual claimancy
will fall below that of the average wage rate. Therefore, qualified individuals will tend to see
buying a franchise as more worthwhile than unqualified individuals.
Independent franchisees, as qualified individuals, are more likely to reveal their capabilities
to entrepreneurs by purchasing franchised outlets. As residual claimants, independent franchisees,
who are different from outlet managers, have incentives to keep existing stores alive and healthy.
Independent franchisees, as the downstream of a hybrid organization, save tons of transaction costs.
Besides, independent franchised outlets locate around the marginal market where have lower
spatial market coverage compared to company-owned sites. Consequently, the arguments of
franchising and agency theory lead to the second and third hypothesis of this paper.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the proportion of company-owned outlets in a local market, the
lower the probability of the location’s survival rate.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the proportion of independent franchised outlets in a local
market, the higher the probability of the location’s survival rate.
Control distance between outlets is also an effective way to reducing monitoring costs by
preventing managers free ride on other’s efforts (Brickley & Dark, 1987). Keeping close to owner
headquarters can extend the survival time of a store (Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2013). The shorter the
distance to monitors, the easier the knowledge flows between outlets. However, as I illustrated
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above, it will raise intra-brand coemption problem if outlets located too close to each other. Winter
et al. (2012) found that increase distance to the closest same brand store lead to higher franchise
unit exit the market. Hence, any distance bigger or smaller than the optimal distance will cause
problems. Therefore, I state the fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: The larger the difference between the distance of two nearest outlets and
desired distance, the lower the probability of the location’s survival rate.
Multi-unit franchisee
A majority of the franchise chains in North America distribute multiple stores to their
franchisees, and this business format is known as multi-unit franchising (Gomez et al., 2010;
Johnson, 2006; Bond, 2005; Wadsworth & Morgan, 2003; Wadsworth, 2002). In the food industry,
multi-unit business format is prevalent; “56% of Dunkin Donuts franchisees, 81% of McDonald’s
franchisees and 49% of Subway franchisees are multi-unit franchisees” (“Multi-unit Franchisee”,
2011). In our study, I showed that in 2015, 79% of KFC, Taco Bell, and Subway outlets, 89% of
Pizza Hut, and McDonald’s sites were operated by multi-unit owners. This trend of the multi-unit
franchisee is not just popular recently, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) showed that one-half of the
national fast-food franchise chains in Texas was owned by either master franchisees or area
developers in 1995. Kaufmann and Dant (1996) found in their survey that almost 90 percent of the
152 fast-food franchise brands involved multi-unit franchisees. Multi-Unit franchisees are drawn
to the potential for significant financial gains produced by owning multiple units and the ability to
achieve greater operating efficiencies.
Multi-Unit franchisees purchase the rights from franchisors to develop and own multiple
locations in an exclusive territory. There are two typical categories of multi-unit franchisees based
on the different contracts signed with franchisors. One contract is that an independent franchisee
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buys and runs several stores sequentially over time, which is known as master franchisees. Master
franchisees of this subfranchising contract play a role as a who is responsible for developing and
monitoring multiple outlets in a particular territory. Another contract is that the franchisees agree
with franchisors to start up and own multiple stores within a specified period in a given geographic
area at the beginning (Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004). This kind of franchisee is also known as an
area developer (Jindal, 2011).
The responsibility of master franchisees is that they need to assisting subfranchisees in
several aspects, i.e., site selection, outlet construction and design, equipment operation, and
employee training. As compensation, the master franchisees get a share of both the one-time initial
lump-sum fee and an ongoing royalty collected from the subfranchisees. A master franchisee is
still a franchisee but plays a subfranchisor role in a mini-franchise chain (Jindal, 2011), so she or
he does not receive any form of fixed income.
The duty of area developers is that they need to identify and lease independent sites, recruit
site managers to monitor these outlets. Area developers pay the full up-front fee for the first outlet
and may get some discounts for the following sites. In return, this type of developer typically
receives a percentage of the franchise fee from each new unit, as well as a percentage of the
ongoing royalty. Hence, area developers play roles as principles in a mini-hierarchy of a franchise
system (Jindal, 2011).
While the mechanism of operation, the responsibilities of master franchisees and area
developers vary greatly, there still exists some commonalities within these two different
franchisees.
First of all, multi-unit franchisees are introduced by franchisors to reduce the costs result
from agency problems and free-riding problems. As franchisees, area developers, and master
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franchisees are both residual claimants whose income comes from a share of outlets profits. Both
of these franchises have a lower motivation to shirking compared to outlet managers. Thus, Gillis
et al. (2011) proposed that multi-unit franchising can reduce agency problems.
Multi-unit franchising is adopted by franchisors to reduce the problems of hierarchical
coordination because of shirking (Jindal, 2011).
Shane (2001) argued that a franchisee with a relatively large number of neighboring
franchisees would have more substantial incentives to free-ride because the positive externality
comes from these neighbors. Thus, a franchisor with densely located outlets (where each outlet
has a large number of neighbors) would face higher franchisee free riding. Franchisors may deter
this free-riding behavior by hiring outlet agents or district managers, but this can lead to a hierarchy
of monitoring relationships (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) and reinforce agency problems (Kaufmann
& Dant, 1996). Hence, multi-unit franchise is introduced to slicing off the lower-level hierarchy;
the franchisor only needs to monitor the master franchisees and/or area developers and leave all
other monitor tasks to multi-unit franchisees. In effect, the franchisor shifts its lower-level
hierarchy to the area developers and/or master franchisees, thereby reducing his incentive to freeride generally (Kalnins & Lafontaine ,2004; Brickley, 1999; Dant & Gundlach, 1999).
Second, the compensation procedure to multi-unit franchisees drives the area developers
and master franchisees to monitor the outlets more seriously compared with the outlet managers.
The first reason is that a multi-unit franchisee plays a role as a franchisor in a mini-franchise chain
or mini-hierarchy. Hence, he or she has the motivation to operate outlets appropriately. The second
reason is that compared to the franchisors, multi-unit franchisees have to deal with fewer
franchisees. This situation makes area developers and master franchisees have more time and
energy to monitor site managers and subfranchisees.
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Third, Barney (1991) argued that institutes could develop resources that are valuable, rare,
and hard to replicate and to replace to gain a competitive advantage in the long-run. These unique
resources include physical capital (i.e., device and geographical location), and human capital (i.e.,
operation experience, and insight). These tangible and intangible resources bring an organization
a sustainable competitive advantage in the market (Barney, 1991).
Area developers joined in a franchise chain with their previous operation experiences and
knowledge, and master franchisees are allowed to develop their subfranchisees if their first outlet
performance is decent. Obviously, multi-unit franchisees contribute both their human and financial
capital resources to building their mini-franchising or mini-hierarchy (Jindal, 2011; Kaufmann &
Dant, 1996).
Knowledge transfer capacities are influential within the multi-unit franchise system
(Hussain & Windsperger, 2010). From a human capital perspective, multi-unit franchisees may
provide more profound managerial experiences than single-unit franchisees, thus transferring their
insights from previous appointments to the franchise. These multi-unit franchisees may possess
specialized expertise in operating sites in particular markets. In fact, the existing literature showed
that multi-unit franchisees master the knowledge of local market demand (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996;
Norton 1988; Mathewson and Winter 1985), consumer tastes (Minkler, 1992), and franchise unit
productivity (Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Lafontaine & Bhattacharyya, 1995).
Consistent with these benefits, Ingram and Baum (1997) found that hotels affiliated with
chains, mostly in the form of multi-unit owners, had lower failure rates than unaffiliated hotels did.
Baum (1999) found that nursing homes affiliated with multi-unit owners also enjoyed lower failure
rates than did the nursing homes of single-unit owners (Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). While knowledge
often does not get transferred directly from franchisee to franchisee (Darr et al., 1995), a transfer
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does take place with the franchisor as an intermediary. Thus, multi-unit franchisees have been
considered superior to single-franchisees for the purpose of transferring knowledge and
experiences from one location to another (Kogut & Zander, 1992) and for coordinating and
integrating activities across locations (Chandler, 1977, p. 235).
The geographical advantage is another factor that promotes the transfer of human capital.
Distance has been shown to inhibit the transfer of knowledge between subsidiaries of the same
firm (Adams & Jaffe, 1996), implying that even if the distantly gained knowledge were appropriate,
it might never reach other units located far from the unit where the knowledge was first developed.
Multi-unit franchisees typically own clusters of outlets in one spatial area (Kalnins & Lafontaine,
2004; Baum et al., 2000). This geographically and demographically concentration of the
franchisee’s units is especially beneficial as it simultaneously minimizes the costs to the franchisee
of monitoring all his units and makes the best possible use of the franchisee’s expertise in a specific
type of markets.
Another benefit created by the geographical concentration of the multi-unit franchisee is
the economies of scale, which further contribute to the capital resources transmission within the
franchise system (Garg, Priem, & Rasheed, 2013; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). For example, in
comparison to single-unit franchisees, fewer resources need to be invested in personnel selection
and induction if multiple units are under the management of one franchisee. The costs of hiring,
training, and monitoring may also be reduced as multi-unit franchisees usually have a proven and
successful track record, thus having a higher chance of doing well in the new appointment. Overall,
the resource-based arguments outlined here support the idea that multi-unit franchisees are
positively related to the locations’ survival rate.
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The third benefit created by geographical concentration is the multi-unit franchisees,
enhance the competitive position of the system in the long-term. For example, fast mini-franchise
chain growth across spaces can lead to the development of a strong presence and create barriers to
entry for competitors.
Furthermore, multi-unit franchisees are often viewed as high-quality, knowledgeable
franchisees by franchisors. Therefore, franchisors can save the high cost of finding franchisee
candidates, as well as reducing the risk of adverse selection by employing multi-unit franchisees
(Bradach, 1998). The knowledgeable and experienced franchisees improve the market
performance of each outlet they operated and keep a sustainable development for the whole minifranchise and mini-hierarchy. These arguments lead to the hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 5a: The greater the multi-unit franchised outlet size, the higher the probability
of location’s survival rate.
Unlike Subway, KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell, companies prefer to recruit franchisees
who own multi-unit operations experiences and have motivations to run local outlets (recruiting
information can be found from these brands’ official websites). Therefore, I assume that YUM!
Brands different from Subway, take the different operational franchising strategy.
Hypothesis 5b: KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell, compared to Subway, take multi-unit
franchise strategies to keep the higher probability of location’s survival rate.
3.3 Methodology
This section describes the models and measures used in this study. Three different datasets
are included. A pooled cross-section study will identify the location’s survival situation across
three biggest Yum! Brands and one Subway franchise chains in a two different time period, 2015
and 2020. A spatial measure of market coverage is created which discloses a franchise system’s
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local market demand, and geographical dispersion and cluster condition. The underlying reason to
create this spatial market coverage is that not only the market demand but also the travel time from
demand locations to convenience stores affect customers patronize convince stores. This spatial
market coverage is important factors influence the sustainability of business locations.
Another purpose of this study is to examine the relationships among location’s survival
rate and the conventional structural characteristics of franchising, such as, franchisors, independent
franchisees, and multi-unit franchises, with the control of local market competition level.
3.3.1 Data
Yum! Brands are one of the Fortune 1000 companies, and it operates many well-known
brands. KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell are the three oldest chains, and according to the 2019 QSR
50 report (Quick Service Restaurant [QSR], 2019), their system sales were ranked at the first 15
across the top 50 United States fast-food franchise chains in 2018. Together these three top sales
YUM! Brands had national-wide sales of $ 20.2 billion in 2018. To better understand the effects
of spatial market coverage and franchise ownership on outlet survival rate, I also include the other
two top sales franchise systems, McDonald’s, and Subway. These two systems owned 28% fastfood restaurants. While franchisors and franchisees operate KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and
McDonald’s, Subway is only run by franchisees.
FRANDATA provided a list location of three YUM! Brands, and Subway in the United
States for the period of 2015 and 2020 for both company-owned and franchisee-owned addresses.
The list contained the franchisee name, franchise ownership, and outlet address. All decimal
degrees geocode of four brands stores’ locations were provided by Texas A&M Geoservices.
Census Bureau and ZIPCODES provide information about geographic codes, population, business
establishments and land area. These two datasets are used to calculate the measures of traditional
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market coverage, market competition, population density and geographic concentration. Combing
the list of three top YUM! Brands locations with all Subway and McDonald’s locations, we provide
a thorough depiction of quick-service food locations.
I identified all the duplicate address data across four fast-food franchise brands, KFC, Pizza
Hut, Taco Bell, and Subway, of both years, and delete 1,205 rows of data. U.S. county served as
the unit of observations, where aggregate measures of sums, minimums, maximums, latitude, and
longitude for each zip code area were produced. To better study the impact of spatial market
coverage on the survival rate of fast-food restaurants, I chose the largest 200 counties based on the
number of outlets in 2015. Because counties with a small number of customers, location is more
meaningful to a business person than spatial coverage. Locations of restaurants in outlying
communities, outside a contiguous, uniform, urbanized area were eliminated. After trimming and
correcting, I finally keep 25,082 out of 61,494 stores across five brands, and they were located in
155 county areas.
To observe outlets' survival situation, I matched street addresses, city, and state data of
2020 data file with the trimmed 2015 data. I corrected 304 wrong zip codes during the
identification process. 41,257 rows of data were dropped due to they are not the 155 counties of
2015, exist of the market, or new stores in 2020. I kept 19,364 rows of data of the four brands of
2020. Totally, 44,446 addresses of KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and Subway were kept.
3.3.2 Models and Variables
Model
I analyze location’s survival rate with a Logistic model (Greene, 2000, p. 840) to test our
hypotheses. The Logistic model is a nonlinear model which is used when the dependent variable
is categorical. This nonlinear model is based on the latent (unobserved) variable model,
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∗
!!"#
= $!#% % + '!#

Where, (: county,
1: the number of the store3;
:: year.
$!#% represents all possible factors in county i of time t affect the probability of survival of store j
∗
located at i at time t. !!"#
is the latent variable, it means the propensity of a store j at location i can
∗
survive at time t. If the latent variable !!"#
is greater than zero, the observed binary response y!"#
∗
takes on the value 1; if !!"#
is less than or equal to zero, y!"# takes on 0. That means, the survival

probability of a store j located in county i at time t is greater than zero, the franchise location will
not exist the market; or, this site will exit the market.
y!"#

1,
==
0,

∗
location is survived, if !!"#
>0
∗
location is failed,
if !!"# ≤ 0

This nonlinear model can be rewritten as
∗
P(y!"# = 1|$!# ) = H(%& + %' $' + ⋯ + %( $( ) = H($!#% %) = KL!!"#
> 0M$!# N

= K($!#% % + '!# > 0|$!# )
= K('!# > −$!#% %|$!# )
= 1 − H(−$!#% %)
= H($!#% %)

I recode stores in each county from 1 to n. We randomly select a location and set it as 1, then
choose the closest store and assign number 2 to this store. Using this rule, we select the third store
which most closes to the second store. Repeating this process, every store in each county has a
unique number.
3
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H($!#% %) is a cumulative distribution function ranges from zero to one. The response
probability is thus a function of the independent variables $!# guaranteed to be between zero and
one. Here, I assume H($!#% %) is a logistic function
PrL!!"# = 1|$!# N =

exp (S& + %! $!# )
1 + exp (S& + %! $!# )

Therefore, I can apply the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) model to estimate the marginal
effects %T of the possible factors $!# .
Dependent Variables
There are multiple methods to measure a franchise outlet performance: in terms of location
survival, sales, reputation score, number of employees. In this study, I examine the effect of spatial
market coverage, ownership on franchise locations’ ability to remain in business. The dependent
variable in our analysis is the location’s hazard of failure. Outlets are at risk of failure (exit) until
the end of our observation period or until they have permanently closed down as indicated by our
data (Winter et al., 2012). Thus, outlets are not considered to have exited in the case of mere
ownership transfers, as long as the same outlet is operating at the same location within the same
franchise system. Outlets failed to renew the contract, or sell to a new franchisee or buy back by a
company-owned unit represent business failures (Holmberg & Morgan, 2003).
In the logistic regression model, dependent variable, outlet survival, equals to 1 if a unit in
2015 is still alive in 2020; outlet survival equals to 0 if a unit closed in 2020.
Independent Variables
Spatial Market Coverage
Adequate market coverage is the critical goal in the development any franchising system
that desires to be a well-recognized, national branded system. Past efforts to examine routes to
effective coverage (Stassen & Grunhagen, 2016, 2011) have been limited in interpretation, such
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as a ratio of establishments per the market’s demand (Blair & LaFontaine, 2005). The advantage
of this traditional market coverage is that it includes market demand, however, the disadvantage
side is that it ignores the spatial distribution. Thus, the traditional market coverage inevitable lead
franchisors and franchisees to pursue start more stores to meet market demand. However, this blind
expansion will result in over stored in urban markets and under stored in some rural markets; with
too high, or too low of a ratio of stores per person, per household. Since outlets are developed
with a known revenue for location, a saturated market risks reducing sales per store, and increases
the likelihood that the franchisee operates underperforming locations, and reduces the demand of
new franchisees.
To address this over stored or under stored issues, I create a new spatial market coverage
measure which includes the outlets spatial distribution information by introducing geographic data.
The greater the spatial market coverage, the stronger the repeat purchasing of the brand, and the
stronger the brand’s value in regard to competition.
In short, having an outlet in visibility of competing formats is likely more important today
than the benefits assured from an exclusivity of a territory or location in terms of the number of
stores or size of population. A measure of spatial coverage would be beneficial in understanding
a franchise format that benefits from high visibility and outlets in a market, with less dependence
on assessing the size of the market.
To measure a spatial coverage in the county, a ratio of the product of range in latitude and
range in longitude for each brand to the same product of ranges for the market was used. Moreover,
I combine the spatial characteristics with market demand and exclusive territory (Blair &
Lafontaine, 2002; Zeller et. al., 1980; Brothers, 1977; Claus & Hardwick, 1972).
Spatial Market Coverage
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^! ≥ 2 (1)
0 < ^! < 2 (2)

Where
^! : total number of stores in each county i.
c5 : franchise chain, h = 1,2, …,
in which, 1 is KFC, 2 is Pizza Hut, 3 is Taco Bell and 4 is Subway.
m: different market based on county i.
HD678. : Haversine distance4 of the range of latitude of outlets in each chain or market.
HD69:;. : Haversine distance of the range of longitude of outlets in each chain or market.

4

The foundation of the spatial market coverage measure relies on the Haversine algorithm (c.f.,

van Brummelen, 2013). The Haversine formula uses the latitudes and longitudes of two locations
on a sphere to calculate the shortest distance. This algorithm is widely used in modern navigation
systems. The Haversine formula states below:
•
fc|'}~(^' (•) = ~(^4 ( )
2
Several steps we should follow when we calculate the great circle distance between two
locations A and B on the earth. First, the geographical information, latitude and longitude of two
locations, (Ä< , Å< ), and (Ä= , Å= ) c}' }'Ça(}'É. Setting up the distance between the two
locations as d, and assume the radius of the earth is R. Hence,
É = 2Ñ ~(^>' ÖÜ~(^4 á

Ä< − Ä=
Å< − Å=
à + â_~Ä< â_~Ä= ~(^4 ä
ãå
2
2
?

Then, substituting any expressions of the form ~(^4 á4 à with the haversine formula. Finally,
we have the distance d:
É = Ñ ℎc|'}~(^>' (ℎc|'}~(^(Ä< − Ä= ) + â_~Ä< â_~Ä= ℎc|'}~(^(Å< − Å= ))
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When one county has more than one stores, I use the function (1); otherwise, I use function (2).
-

"
The first part of function (1) (@,AB)*#!,) discloses the market demand of local market i. The
"

C(EF#$%. )∗HEF#'(). IJ

second part ( C(EF

",+!

#$%. )∗HEF#'(). IJ",,

) of the function (1) displays the spatial distribution of chain âK in

the market i. To account for difference in latitude and longitude distances at different positions in
the market, all ranges where adjusted with the Haversine Distance formula, to calculate the shortest
great-circle distances between two locations on a sphere. I choose Haversine Distance algorithm
because it is popular in our current navigation system. If this spatial distribution equals to one, it
means the brand coverage of the market is perfect; if it closes to zero, it means all outlets of this
brand located close to each other, encroachment problem is very serious in the market i.
Considering the exclusive territory problem, I include the third part (

(
∑(
- MN: {EF-,-./ }",-0/

-

− 6),

distance punishment factor, to our first function. There is extensive research show that the optimal
trade area for fast-food location is two to three miles (Anderson, 1984; Zeller et. al., 1980; Claus
& Hardwick, 1972). Salomon Brothers (1977) reported that 80 percent of McDonald’s customers
would like to patronize an outlet within three miles. Iowa Franchise Act of 1992 set a three-mile
radius around the incumbent franchisee outlet as an exclusive territory (Blair & Lafontaine, 2002).
Therefore, six miles between two locations is an optimal distance for both customers and
entrepreneurs; over six miles is not good for customers to raise brand recognition, and less than
six miles will cause intra-brand competition.
If there is only one store in the local market, I will use function (2). According to the
exclusive territory experiences (Zeller et. al., 1980; Brothers, 1977; Claus & Hardwick, 1972) and
policy (Blair & Lafontaine, 2002), I set the trade area as 9. Thus, the spatial market coverage is
-"
@,AB)*#!,-"

∗ 9.
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Franchise ownership
I am interested in investigating the relation between franchise ownerships and business
location survival rate. In the franchise system, there are three different ownerships: franchisors,
independent franchisees and multi-unit franchisees. A franchisor is a company which grants a
license to franchisees, either independent franchisees or multi-unit franchisees, for conducting of
a business under the franchisor’s marks. These three different franchise roles work together to
open outlets and expand markets. To distinguish the effects of these three different franchise
ownerships on location’s survival rate, I will illustrate the ownership measures below.
I use the proportion of company-owned units of all outlets in the market as the franchisor
measure, the number of independent franchised outlets of all stores as the single franchisee
measure, and the ratio of the multi-unit franchise stores over the number of multi-unit franchisees
in the market as the multi-unit franchisee measure.
Difference between the mean miles and the desired miles
As convenience foods, the most crucial feature is that it can be reached out by patrons
easily. Previous studies showed that the desired distance for customers to arrive at one convenience
store is no more than three miles (Anderson, 1984; Zeller et al., 1980; Claus & Hardwick, 1972).
Hence, the desired miles between two outlets within a brand is six miles. Any customers within
the six miles area of two convenience stores can quickly stop by.
In each county, I summed up the miles between the nearest outlets first, and then average
this total mile to have the mean miles. I subtracted the desired miles between two locations from
the average mean miles. At last, give the absolute sign to this difference to have the variable of
difference between the mean miles and the desired miles.
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Control Variables
Dummy variables of franchises chains
To strength the empirical tests, I include several control variables in our paper. Dummy
variables measure the fast-food category. KFC specializes in fried chicken, and it is the world's
second-largest restaurant chain (as measured by sales) after McDonald's, with 22,621 locations
globally in 136 countries as of December 2018. Pizza Hut was founded in 1958 in Kansas. The
company is known for its Italian-American cuisine menu, including pizza and pasta, as well as
side dishes and desserts. Pizza Hut has 18,431 restaurants worldwide as of December 31, 2018,
making it the world's largest pizza chain in terms of locations. The restaurants serve a variety of
Mexican inspired foods that include tacos, burritos, quesadillas, nachos, novelty, and specialty
food. Subway is a unique franchise chain that does not have franchisors' stores but only has
franchisees' stores. It is one of the fastest-growing franchises globally, and it had 41,512 locations
in more than 100 countries in 2019.
Including different franchise chains is a good way to explore whether the different food
category affect outlet survival rate. In this paper, I set KFC brand as c' , Pizza Hut equal to c4 ,
Taco Bell as number cR , and Subway as cS .
The total number of employee firms
One way to measure the performance of a fast-food restaurant is by how many people
patronage it. Therefore, the economic environment around fast-food restaurants becomes very
important. If there are many companies near a fast-food restaurant, it means that the surrounding
economic environment is good, and there are many potential customers who can visit these quickservice restaurants. Therefore, the number of employee firms would be a factor that influences a
site's survival.
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Population density
Population density is defined as the number of individuals per county area (per square miles
of a county) in this paper. The high the population density, the high the probability people live
here to visit and revisit these fast food units.
Geographical concentration
Geographic concentration is an effective way to save monitoring cost and improve brand
name recognition (Castrogiovanni et al., 1993). The more geographically concentrated the
franchise system, the more the firm is able to economize on agency costs. Geographic
concentration is measured as
Geographic concentration =

^!
c}'c _ê :ℎ' âℎc(^ c5 (^ c ëc}í': ë

Region
Region is a demographical variable, the fourth control variable in this paper. It is
commonly separated states into four regions: the Northeast, South, West, and Midwest. A different
region may have a different culture, history, consumer behavior. So, I include four regions of the
U.S. in my analysis.
3.4 Results
Table 2 discloses the number of franchisees and their sizes in 2015 in the four fast-food
brands I work on: KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and Subway. The table shows that independent
franchisees occupy 17.8% of all the franchisees across these four brands, and they only operate
12.4% outlets among all the franchisees. The total number of the multi-unit franchise-owned stores
are 18,185, which occupies 94% of all trimmed outlets in 155 metropolitan counties. Overall, the
table demonstrates the importance of multi-unit franchisees in these large four fast-food franchise
systems. Furthermore, this table shows that KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell all own a relatively
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large proportion of independent franchisees, 55%, 37%, and 46%. However, Subway only has 5%
independent franchisees, and 88% of outlets operated by 1,777 multi-unit franchisees. 74% of
multi-unit franchisees operated more than one outlet but less than ten units. The average multiunit franchise's outlet size of YUM! Brands are more significant than Subway, 10, 26, 13, and 5,
respectively. The results show that Subway is inclined to involve more franchisees with smaller
multi-unit franchised outlets, which is very different from the YUM! Brands strategy.
Table 3 shows the miles between the nearest stores in the largest and smallest outlets across
four franchise systems. The mean miles of each YUM! Brands, KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell,
are 6.28, 5.43, and 5.75, respectively. It is all very close to the desired miles between two nearest
units of a brand. Nevertheless, the average miles are 13.32 between the two closest sites of Subway.
The results disclose that Subway located stores dispersedly compared to the three YUM! Brands.
Los Angeles County is the biggest county for four of the brands I focused on. Subway has
more outlets than the total number of franchise units owned by KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell.
Similarly, three YUM! Brands located their outlets more properly; their difference between the
mean miles and the optimal six miles is smaller than Subway. The maximum miles between two
nearest outlets of KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell are much smaller than Subway's 51 miles. This
evidence clearly shows that the mean miles between two nearest sites play an important role in the
percentage of survival outlets in 2020.
Table 4 shows the minimum, maximum, means, standard deviations of each independent
variable of all brands I studied in the paper. The minimum spatial market coverage of four brands
is all negative, which means the outlets in these counties all have different levels of clustering
problems. In which, the Subway's intra-brand coemption is the most serious (-12.09) due to the
largest number of outlets. The company-owned store ratio is zero for Subway because it only has
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franchised locations. Compared to KFC and Pizza Hut, Taco Bell has a large proportion of
franchisors (20%). The average multi-unit franchised store size is 5.33 for KFC, 6.13 for Pizza
Hut, 5.37 for Taco Bell, and 3.89 for Subway. The evidence shows that Subway prefers to use
small multi-unit franchised store sizes compared to the other three brands.
The mean number of independent franchisees is 3.64 of four franchise chains. Pizza Hut
has the smallest number of independent franchisees (0.43), and Subway has the most significant
number of independent franchisees (12.05). Overall, except Subway, the proportion of independent
franchisee of three YUM! Brands are very small.
The average difference between the mean miles and the desired miles of Subway is 7.32
miles, much larger than the other three YUM! Brands'. Compared to KFC, Pizza Hut and Taco
Bell's outlets located close to each other.
Table 5 is a correlation matrix of all the independent variables of the paper. The highest
correlation coefficient between two predictors is 0.54, occurring between multi-unit franchised
store size and the interaction term of Pizza Hut and Multi-unit franchised store size.
Table 6 shows the results of the logistic regressions that predict outlet survival rate. The
results are shown in the first column of the table support hypothesis 1, 3, and 4. Spatial market
coverage increases lead to unit survival rate decreases. Independent franchisees have a positive
effect on location survival rates. When the distance between the two nearest locations is greater or
smaller than the desired miles, the location survival rate decreases.
Hypothesis 2 is rejected; the larger the company-owned store ratio leads to the higher unit
survival rate. The results of hypothesis 5a are not significant at 5% level. To test the hypothesis
5b, I add interaction terms to the regression. The interaction term of YUM! Brands and multi-unit
franchise store sizes become significant at 1% level, and all three interaction variables are
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significant. The finding shows that three YUM! Brands, compared to Subway, has a significant
high location survival rate, holding the multi-unit franchise store size at the mean level. Figure 1
discloses the difference probability for Subway and KFC at all levels of multi-unit franchised
outlet size. The figure shows that the difference probability is significant. Figure 2 and 3 show the
same relationship just between Subway and Pizza Hut, and Subway and Taco Bell. Their
difference probabilities are also significant at all different levels of multi-unit franchised outlet
size.
I conducted many robustness tests for model 2, and include several results to Table 6. I add
the total number of employee firms, geographical concentration, population density, and region
factors to do robustness checks. None of these models change the sign and significance level of
the independent variables in model 2.
3.5 Discussion
The goal of this paper aimed to explore factors that affect the outlet survival rate. My
findings provide strong evidence that spatial market coverage and franchise ownerships could
influence the unit's survival. This paper's data is unique and extremely good; it has all the outlet
street and franchise ownership information. This distinctive data provides an excellent opportunity
to create a valuable spatial market coverage measure with a strong criterion validity. This study is
the first paper to explore how franchisors, multi-unit franchisees, and single franchisees affect
mature fast-food restaurant's survival by controlling demographical and business environment
factors.
The results of this paper are valuable for the franchising research field. Much of the
franchise survival studies focus on either the new franchise systems or the franchisor companies.
My study indicates that the store losses in the mature franchise system are also a big problem what
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researchers need to raise concerns. The unit survival, compared to how business system survival,
is more common in the modern market. Therefore, researchers need to spend efforts to explore the
reasons that affect individual outlet survival or failure. Future research should extend study
dimensions to a dynamic world and space perspective.
Space or geographical feature is an inevitable feature of the franchising and retailing
industry. Closing an existing store or allocating a new outlet, spatial feature affects these stores
development. Therefore, I advocate employing geographic coordinates to develop a spatial
coverage measure to improve the unit and system performance.
Miles between the two nearest outlets within the same brand have a significantly negative
effect on the site survival. Future studies should also consider miles between competitors and
nearest franchisors/multi-unit franchisees. The possible reason is that knowledge transfer from
franchisors to franchisees, and from area developers/master franchisees to franchisees in minichains are much faster. Sharing knowledge and experience with local franchisees and franchisors
can improve the outlet's survival rate.
Franchise ownership effect is also an essential factor which researchers should continue to
explore in the future. My results provide evidence that company ownership and independent
franchisees have a positive effect on outlet survival rate. However, which effect is more significant
should be studied.
My study results have important implications for entrepreneurs in both the franchise and
the retailing industry. My paper indicates that the spatial market coverage measure can be used as
guidance for practitioners to allocate or reallocate outlets. Company-ownership locations,
compared to the other two different franchisees, have a higher unit survival rate. Thus,
entrepreneurs have more company-owned outlets that can guarantee better performance in the
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market. Involving a bigger multi-unit franchised store size can control intra-brand competition so
that it keeps a high location survival rate.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of Stores Description across Four Fast-food Franchise Systems in the
United States
2015

KFC

Pizza Hut

Taco Bell

Subway

4,485

8,435

7,373

27,418

Number of
Stores

2020
4,045
7,568
6,836
24,958
Percentage of
9.8%
10.3%
7.3%
9.0%
Store Losses
Note: Percentage of Store Losses is calculated by the difference in the number of stores of two
years over the number of outlets in the year 2015.
Table 2: Number of Franchisees and Their Size in 2015
Size
of
Franchisees
1 unit
2 unit
3-5 units
6-10 units
11-20 units
21-50 units
51-100 units
101+ units
Total units
Total franchisees

KFC

Pizza Hut

Taco Bell

Subway

% of Franchisees

168
41
43
24
13
12
1
2
1,509
304

66
26
29
18
10
21
5
5
3,074
160

146
33
34
42
36
20
6
1
2,331
318

96
736
690
228
79
38
5
1
11,271
3,741

17.8
31.3
29.8
11.7
5.2
3.4
0.6
0.3

Note: Size is defined as number of units the franchisees owned in a brand.
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Table 3: Summary of Variables
Variables
SMC
%CO
Msize
NIF
DMM
TNEF
PD
GC
NS

Description
Mean
SD
Spatial Market Coverage
0.04
0.25
Company-owned Store Ratio
0.06
0.15
Multi-unit Franchised Store Size
5.59
4.49
Number of Independent Franchisees
13.78
20.90
Difference between the Mean Miles
and the Desired Miles
0.04
0.22
Total Number of Employee Firms
42181.39 52631.41
Population Density
5008.35 17523.96
Geographical Concentration
0.29
1.38
Number of Outlets
101.70
130.97

Min
-0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max
3.09
1.00
37.00
96.00

-0.06
539.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

2.59
228558.00
196703.60
16.43
623.00

Table 4: Miles between the Nearest Outlets in the Largest/Smallest Number of Outlets in
Metropolitan Counties
NS in 2015

% Survival Outlet
in 2020

DMM

Min.M

Max.M

KFC
Los Angeles County, CA
Orleans Parish, LA
Mean Miles
Number of Counties

110
1
6.28
154

0.92
0.00

2.92
0.00

0.00
0.00

31.35
0.00

Pizza Hut
Los Angeles County, CA
San Francisco County, CA
Mean Miles
Number of Counties

209
2
5.43
153

0.86
1.00

0.71
-2.98

0.00
3.02

41.71
3.02

Taco Bell
Los Angeles County, CA
Suffolk County, MA
Mean Miles
Number of Counties

169
2
5.75
155

0.93
1.00

3.69
7.69

0.00
13.69

33.68
13.69

Subway
Los Angeles County, CA
Marion County, OR
Mean Miles
Number of Counties

623
19
13.32
155

0.55
0.68

3.72
-4.35

0.00
0.42

60.98
2.66

Note: Desired Miles is defined as six miles between two nearest outlets. I used the average miles of
a county minus the desired miles to calculate the difference between the mean miles and the desired
miles. Min.M: Minimum miles between two nearest outlets in 2015. Max.M: Maximum miles
between two nearest outlets in 2015

78

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Counts for Metropolitan Counties by Brand.
Min

Metro county/parish

Outlets

Max

Metro county/parish

Outlets

Mean

SD

KFC
SMC

-0.62

Pinellas County, FL

15

0.92

Montgomery County, PA

5

0.88

0.21

%CO

0.00

Lee County, FL

6

1.00

Oklahoma County, OK

15

0.12

0.23

MFS

0.00

Salt Lake County, UT

15

37.00

Lubbock County, TX

7

5.33

5.25

NIF

0.00

Davidson County, TN

11

17.00

Los Angeles County, CA

110

1.09

2.21

DMM

-6.00

Orleans Parish, LA

1

10.35

Cameron County, TX

6

0.28

2.51

Observations: 154 counties and 1,765 outlets
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Pizza Hut
SMC

-1.58

Anchorage Municipality, AK

10

3.36

Montgomery County, TX

20

-0.07

0.64

%CO

0.00

Onondaga County, NY

13

0.91

East Baton Rouge Parish, LA

11

0.08

0.15

MFS

1.00

East Baton Rouge Parish, LA

11

23.00

Los Angeles County, CA

209

6.13

3.78

NIF

0.00

Guilford County, NC

18

9.00

Los Angeles County, CA

209

0.43

1.00

DMM

-5.25

New York County, NY

5

5.76

Harris County, TX

145

-0.57

1.95

Observations: 153 counties and 3,335 outlets

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Counts for Metropolitan Counties by Brand (Cont.)
Min

Metro county/parish

Outlets

Max

Metro county/parish

Outlets

Mean

SD

Taco Bell
SMC

-1.29

Denver County, CO

18

3.21

Pasco County, FL

10

-0.04

0.63

%CO

0.00

Lee County, FL

11

1.00

Kern County, CA

21

0.20

0.22

MFS

0.00

Douglas County, NE

18

23.00

Travis County, TX

26

5.37

4.28

NIF

0.00

Hamilton County, TN

15

31.00

Clark County, NV

52

0.94

2.76

DMM

-5.43

New York County, NY

3

7.69

Suffolk County, MA

2

-0.25

2.31

New York County, NY

136

308.99

Placer County, CA

35

7.05

42.05

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Observations: 155 counties and 2,993 outlets
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Subway
SMC

-12.09

%CO

N/A

N/A

MFS

1.64

Washington County, OR

37

26.00

Anchorage Municipality, AK

26

3.89

2.61

NIF

0.00

Stark County, OH

29

96.00

Cook County, IL

454

12.05

12.96

DMM

-5.48

New York County, NY

136

258.82

Kern County, CA

30

7.32

38.45

Observations: 155 counties and 11,271 outlets

Note: Counties were selected based on the number of outlets of three YUM! Brands, Subway, and MacDonald’s franchise
chains. These 155 counties have the largest number of stores of these four brands. The county name is the county, which has
the median number of outlets of the corresponding variable. The sign of the Spatial Market Coverage shows the store's
distribution situation of a county. The negative sign means stores of a county cluster together. Subway doesn’t have
company-owned stores; thus, the row of Company-owned Store Ratio was filled with N/A.

Table 6: Correlation Confidents of Variables
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1) Outlet Survival Rate

81

(2) SMC

-.09

(3) %CO

.19

(4) MFS

.15

(5) NIF

-.15

(6) DMM

-.06

(7) KMFS

.11

(8) PMFS

.16

(9) TMFS

.15

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

-.06
-.04
.09
.12
-.03
-.05
-.05

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

-.05
-.02
-.04

3

3

3

-.21
.02

.00

.44

-.01

.54

.24

3

.40

3

2

3

3

3

-.07
-.13
-.22
-.18

3

3

3

3

.00
.03
-.04

3

3

-.08
-.07

3

3

-.12

3

Note: Total number of observations is 19,364 which includes three YUM! Brands and one Subway brand. Outlet
Survival Rate is defined as 1 if the store in year 2015 is still alive in 2020 Spatial Market Coverage, Companyowned Store Ratio, Multi-unit Franchised Store Size, Number of Independent Franchisees, and Difference with
Desired Mean Miles are all aggregated measures based on 155 counties. 1 p<.1; 2 <.05; 3 p<.01

Table 7: Results of Logistic Binary Regression Analyses Predicting Outlet Survival Rate
Model 1
B

Model 2

z

Const.

0.00

-0.05

SMC

-0.37

-4.90

%CO

0.67

3.47

MFS

0.01

1.73

NIF

0.00

3.85

DMM

-0.17

-4.48

KFC

2.12

23.74

PH

1.59

25.60

TB

1.77

23.30

B

Model 3

z

0.17

3.54

-0.36

-4.89

0.82

4.13

-0.03

-3.38

0.00

3.41

-0.17

-4.60

1.98

15.79

1.16

10.62

1.38

11.86

KMFS

0.03

2.46

PMFS

0.07

5.01

TMFS

0.07

4.73

B
3

Model 4

z

5.23

0.07

4.38

-0.11

-2.29

1.41

11.57

0.04

2.65

0.07

4.50

0.05

0.82

0.07

5.38

0.07

4.64

-0.09

-1.88

0.00

1.77

PD

0.00

1.44

-0.14

-2.92

GC

-0.11

-2.76

-0.02

-0.51

South

0.19

4.70

MW

-0.21

-3.67

3

West

-0.24

-3.17

2

ChiSquare
Obs.

0.07

10.30

2.34

TNEF

2.06

1.14

0.03

3

0.03

14.90

11.47

3

11.97

1.95

1.38

3

1.43

-3.80

10.29

3

10.73

-0.14

1.13

3

1.16

2.33

15.25

3

15.83

0.00

1.98

3

2.04

-2.89

-4.77

3

-4.65

-0.03

-0.18

3

-0.17

3.24

3.86

3

3.94

0.63

0.00

3

0.00

-3.17

-3.01

3

-2.66

-0.24

2

-0.03

3

-0.03

2.30

4.17

3

4.13

0.14

0.83

1

0.82

z

-4.97

3

-4.78

B

-0.38

3

-0.35

3

2.67

3

2.98

z

0.15

3

0.15

B
3

Model 5

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3

3

2409.76

2400.65

2399.73

2409.26

2486.71

19,364

19,364

19,364

19,364

19,364

3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3

Note: PH: Pizza Hut. TB: Taco Bell. MW: Midwest. KMFS: KFC×Multi-unit Franchised Store
Size. PMFS: PH×Multi-unit Franchised Store Size. TMFS: TB×Multi-unit Franchised Store Size.
1
p<.1; 2 <.05; 3 p<.01
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Note: The graph illustrates that the difference in probabilities for Subway and KFC is statistically
significant at all multi-unit franchised outlet sizes. Blue solid line: the probability difference
between Subway and KFC. Green dash line: the upper level of 95% confidence interval. Red dash
line: the bottom level of 95% confidence interval.
Figure 1: SW-KFC difference with all independent variables at means

Note: The graph illustrates that the difference in probabilities for Subway and Pizza Hut is
statistically significant at all levels of multi-unit franchised outlet size. Blue solid line: the
probability difference between Subway and KFC. Green dash line: the upper level of 95%
confidence interval. Red dash line: the bottom level of 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2: SW-PH difference with all independent variables at means
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Note: The graph illustrates that the difference in probabilities for Subway and Taco Bell is
statistically significant at all levels of multi-unit franchised outlet size. Green dash line: the upper
level of 95% confidence interval. Red dash line: the bottom level of 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3: SW-TB difference with all independent variables at means
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4. Conclusion
In this dissertation, I focus on the franchising research field, especially on the spatial
market coverage, franchise ownership, and outlet survival. In the franchising industry, brand
recognition achieved by the frequencies of customers’ revisit. Therefore, allocating outlets
reasonably, and covering the market properly to meet the market demand is a crucial task for
franchisors. Having an effective market coverage measure is useful guidance for entrepreneurs to
follow to make the franchise unit and the whole system survive from the competitive market.
The first chapter creates a new spatial market coverage by introducing latitude and
longitude data of each outlet of five top fast-food franchise brands. This spatial market coverage
provides a visual description of market distribution, and illustrate the relationships between
franchise ownerships well. The results show that Taco Bell is the only one in which companyowned outlets have a substantial effect on market coverage. Independent franchisees play an
essential role when the franchise system wants to expand the market. This finding coincides with
previous theory (Rubin, 1978) that franchised stores are likely to locate at the margin market.
Employing a multi-unit franchisee to run a large proportion of units is also an applicable method
to own good spatial market coverage. However, the traditional market coverage is very weak in
explaining the relationship between the structural characteristics of the 3 YUM! Brands.
Chapter 2 extends the spatial market coverage by considering market demand and distances
between outlets within the same chain. This updated spatial market coverage provides a more
comprehensive description of the outlets’ distribution. This essay’s findings demonstrate that
spatial market coverage negatively affects an outlet’s survival rate because of the intrabrand
coemption. Franchisors have a strong effect on location survival rate; the more the companyowned outlets, the higher the location survival rate. Independent franchisees also have a
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significantly positive effect on unit survival. The interesting finding is that the size of multi-unit
franchisee chains has no effect on the location survival rate, but the interaction term of brands and
multi-unit system size can explain unit survival situations very well. Three YUM! Brands,
compared to Subway, have fewer area developers and master franchisees but a sizeable multi-unit
franchisee size. These large mini-franchise chains provide reliable support to the franchise unit.
In conclusion, these two studies, different from previous research, discuss the franchising
field’s hot debates from a distinctive perspective. The findings of spatial market coverage provide
both researchers and practitioners an excellent chance to reconsider their market strategy. This
contribution is considerable in this hybrid business organization. It will spur further and more indepth discussion on the location’s survival.
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